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IN SUPREME JUDGMENT OF THE POOR:
THE ROLE OF THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT IN
WELFARE LAW AND POLICY
Bridgette Baldwin*
“Welfare reform punishes the poor for being poor.
Our responsibility . . . is to end poverty as we know it, not welfare.”
S. Clara Kim1
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INTRODUCTION
At its onset, welfare was reserved almost exclusively for white women. At
that time, poverty was understood to be a cause of temporary societal inequity,
and welfare was a sociallyacceptable solution to those temporary setbacks. 2
However, as Black women entered the welfare rolls, racialized presumptions
about behavior and poverty began to structure the very contours of welfare law.
Welfare and poverty in general came under political attack.3 With increasing
welfare rolls and the changing racial composition of recipients, Congress began
to respond to arguments that poverty was a product of culture, behavior, and
even biologically determined racial traits. 4 Consequently, Congress started to
limit benefits for those deemed “undeserving.”5 Welfare legislation and policy
implementation were less attempts to protect citizens by subsidizing an
economic downturn than the manifestation of an effort to limit citizens’ (Black
women in particular) access to state power and benefits. More and more, Black
workingclass recipients saw the courts, juxtaposed with the overwhelmingly
antagonistic spaces of the local welfare offices and the floor of Congress, as
their most viable sites of struggle and social possibility for a more humane
social welfare worldview.6
Legal decisions are a key way of understanding the larger discussions and
debates within welfare policy and the implications of such policy on the lives
of many workingclass Black women. While the United States Supreme Court
(Supreme Court) has not decided a significant number of cases with direct
bearing on welfare policy, many important and historic cases structuring
current welfare policy and reform were resolved from the 1960s to the present.7
These decisions raised major questions about the parameters and constraints of
welfare entitlement.8 Discussions of the intent and impact of welfare policy
generally focus on the congressional floor, media representations, or the
caseworkerclient relationship.9 This leaves the courts (and the Supreme Court
in particular) inadequately examined as a key institutional space where the
social policy of welfare is implemented.
This article will examine the major Supreme Court rulings since the late
1960s that have directly addressed Aid to Families with Dependent Children

2. See JOANNE L. GOODWIN, GENDER AND THE POLITICS OF WELFARE REFORM:
MOTHER’S PENSION IN CHICAGO (19111929) 16 (1997).
3. See generally ELIZABETH BUSSIERE, (DIS)ENTITLING THE POOR: THE WARREN
COURT, WELFARE RIGHTS, AND THE AMERICAN POLITICAL TRADITION (1997).
4. See ANGEMARIE HANCOCK, THE POLITICS OF DISGUST: THE PUBLIC IDENTITY OF THE
WELFARE QUEEN 5760, 95106 (2004).
5. Id.
6. See MARTHA F. DAVIS, BRUTAL NEED: LAWYERS AND THE WELFARE RIGHTS
MOVEMENT (19601973) 1 (1993).
7. See Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618
(1969); King v. Smith, 392 U.S. 309 (1968).
8. See Goldberg, 397 U.S. at 254; Shapiro, 394 U.S. at 618; King, 392 U.S. at 309.
9. See generally HANCOCK, supra note 4 (discussing congressional, media and
individual perceptions of welfare recipients).
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(AFDC), commonly known as welfare. The Supreme Court decided cases, such
as King v. Smith,10 Shapiro v. Thompson,11 and Goldberg v. Kelly,12 in favor of
welfare recipients.13 The outcomes of these cases suggest that while the
Supreme Court viewed welfare policy as a negotiation between federal and
state governments,14 it reserved a special role for the judicial branch in
protecting equal rights. The judicial understanding of the relationship between
federal and state government power within welfare policy ranged from
“cooperative federalism,” (expanding powers of the national government in
areas traditionally left to the states) to fiscal conservatism (privileging state
power and proffering a handsoff approach). These conceptual rubrics do not
follow a linear narrative nor offer a story of change over time; instead they are
competing approaches that can be implemented by the Supreme Court
simultaneously.
While the historical arch from the Civil Rights Era to the present normally
presents a story of expanded liberties and freedoms to the socially
disenfranchised,15 the lens of the Supreme Court welfare decisions narrates a
much different story. Instead, we see the devolution of racial liberalism, the
intensification and expansion of poverty, and the rise of social conservatism so
familiar by the mid1980s.16 Here, Black women became both the symbolic
scapegoat and the site of social policy surveillance. At the apex of this
symbolic/social policy convergence were national attacks on the stereotyped
“welfare queen” in particular, and any redistribution of national resources to the
poor, in general. Part I of this paper examines Supreme Court case law on
welfare policy through the lens of the Due Process and Equal Protection
Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment. Part II surveys the Supreme Court case
law on welfare policy through the lens of federalism. Finally, Part III reviews

10. King, 392 U.S. at 309.
11. Shapiro, 394 U.S. at 618.
12. Goldberg, 397 U.S. at 254.
13. It is important to note that while not all of the plaintiffs (welfare recipients)
presented in this article are AfricanAmerican mothers, welfare has traditionally been
racialized. At the center of America’s attitude about welfare policy is race and racism and,
therefore, AfricanAmerican mothers were routinely held out as iconographic images of who
was on welfare. Moreover, since AfricanAmerican mothers were disproportionately poor,
any laws regulating entitlement to welfare assistance would also have a disparate impact on
them. For causal certainty, it should also be noted that many of the major figures in these
cases were black women. See, e.g., Goldberg, 397 U.S. at 254; Shapiro, 394 U.S. at 618;
King, 392 U.S. at 309.
14. See, e.g., Shapiro, 394 U.S. at 645 (Warren, J., dissenting); King, 392 U.S. at 316.
15. See DAVID A. HOLLINGER, POSTETHNIC AMERICA: BEYOND MULTICULTURALISM
(1995). For a critique of this vision, see generally CHARLES M. PAYNE, I’VE GOT THE LIGHT
OF FREEDOM: THE ORGANIZING TRADITION AND THE MISSISSIPPI FREEDOM STRUGGLE (1995)
and NIKHIL PAL SINGH, BLACK IS A COUNTRY: RACE AND THE UNFINISHED STRUGGLE OF
DEMOCRACY (2004).
16. See, e.g., ROBERT O. SELF, AMERICAN BABYLON: RACE AND THE STRUGGLE FOR
POSTWAR OAKLAND (2003); THOMAS J. SUGRUE, THE ORIGINS OF THE URBAN CRISIS: RACE
AND INEQUALITY IN POSTWAR DETROIT (1996); WILLIAM JULIUS WILSON, THE TRULY
DISADVANTAGED: THE INNER CITY, THE UNDERCLASS, AND PUBLIC POLICY (1990).
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much of the same case law contrasted through the lens of fiscal conservatism.
Through these lenses, it is clear that the seemingly valueneutral Supreme
Court was not at all immune to the changing political landscape of the nation
over the last forty years.
I.

DUE PROCESS, EQUAL PROTECTION AND FUNDAMENTAL FAIRNESS

A. Substantive Constitutional Rights: Equal Protection and the Fundamental
Right to Travel
During the Warren Court (19531969) and well into the Burger Court
(19691986),17 the concept of equal protection under the law accelerated
rapidly as a new “interventionist” instrument.18 The Supreme Court under Chief
Justice Earl Warren still employed a modest approach toward review of
legislative policies, but the Supreme Court granted certain cases more active
scrutiny.19 Particularly during Warren’s tenure, more issues were reviewed
using a strict scrutiny approach.20 Strict scrutiny is the highest level of review
used by the Supreme Court to review any government laws and policies that
restrict or limit a constitutional right.21 When a government attempts to impose
legislation which infringes on a fundamental right or interest22 or enacts

17. For a survey of Supreme Court cases decided during the first term of the Burger
Court era, see Gerald Gunther, Foreward: In Search of Evolving Doctrine on Changing a
Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1972).
18. Id. During Justice Warren’s tenure, a twotier system of review was employed in
cases involving Equal Protection claims. In most circumstances, equal protection claims
would fail because the Supreme Court would find that the statute in question was
constitutional because the legislative body had a reasonable purpose for the particular
discriminatory practice in place. However, when the statute in question employed a
discriminatory practice based on race, alienage or lineage (suspect classifications) or
encroached a fundamental right or interest, the governing body would have to show more
than a reasonable purpose. On such occasions the Supreme Court would apply a higher level
of scrutiny in determining the constitutionality of a law. For a survey of the equal protection
doctrine, see generally, Developments in the Law—Equal Protection, 82 HARV. L. REV.
1065, 10761192 (1969); Lawrence Schlam, Equality in Culture and Law: An Introduction
to the Origins and Evolution of the Equal Protection Principle, 24 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 425,
445456 (2004); Joseph Tussman & Jacobus tenBroek, The Equal Protection of the Laws, 37
CAL. L. REV. 341, 343365 (1949).
19. See Goldberg, 397 U.S. at 254; Shapiro, 394 U.S. at 618; King, 392 U.S. at 309.
20. See, e.g., Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Comm. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 509
(1969); Abbington v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 294 (1963); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S.
335, 343 (1963); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 660 (1961); Brown v. Bd. of Educ. of
Topeka, 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954).
21. See generally United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938)
(hinting for the first time at a heightened level of scrutiny when “prejudice against discrete
and insular minorities may be a special condition, which tends seriously to curtail the
operation of those political processes ordinarily to be relied upon to protect minorities, and
which may call for a correspondingly more searching judicial inquiry.”).
22. A fundamental right or interest is one that has its foundation from the Constitution,
like the Bill of Rights, the right to vote, the right to travel and the right to privacy. See, e.g.,
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legislation that targets groups identified as a suspect class (groups legally
identified by race, nationality, or alienage)23 the Supreme Court approves of
such legislation only if the government can show that the particular law is
essential, narrowly tailored, and the least restrictive means to accomplish its
goal.24
The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment guarantees an
independent constitutional right that similarly situated citizens be treated
similarly under the law.25 Within welfare law, states may not have directly
attempted to violate the Equal Protection Clause, but nevertheless created
separate rules for its recipients based on gender,26 socioeconomic status,27 and

Police Dep’t of Chicago v. Mosely, 408 U.S. 92, 96 (1972) (acknowledging that rights
established in the first amendment are fundamental rights); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381
U.S. 479, 48485 (1965) (providing examples of fundamental guarantees).
23. In order to qualify as a suspect class, a social group’s characteristics must be
immutable, the group must suffer from a history of discrimination, the group must be
politically impotent, and the group must constitute a distinct and insular minority. Suspect
class refers to a group that has been historically discriminated against in the political process.
For information on how a suspect class is defined, see Nyquist v. Mauclet, 432 U.S. 1, 79
(1977). See also Hernandez v. Texas, 347 U.S. 475, 47778 (1954) (implying that persons of
Mexican descent constitute a suspect class); Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216
(1944) (referencing race as a suspect classification triggering strict scrutiny review); Yick
Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 374 (1886) (implying that persons of Chinese descent
constitute a suspect class).
24. See generally Joel F. Handler, “Constructing Political Spectacle”: The
Interpretation of Entitlements, Legalization, and Obligations in Social Welfare History, 56
BROOK. L. REV. 899 (1990); Charles A. Reich, The New Property, 73 YALE L.J. 733 (1964).
25. “State[s] [shall not] deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due
process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the
laws.” U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. For a survey of the tiers of review used to analyze the
Equal Protection Doctrine, see Edward J. Imwinkelried, Of Evidence and Equal Protection:
The Unconstitutionality of Excluding Government Agents' Statements Offered as Vicarious
Admissions Against the Prosecution, 71 MINN. L. REV. 269, 29197 (1986). See generally
Robert F. Williams, Equality Guarantees in State Constitutional Law, 63 TEX. L. REV. 1195
(1985).
26. The Court has been reticent to apply the strict scrutiny to cases involving
discriminatory treatment on the basis of gender. However, classifications based on gender
are considered quasisuspect, thus triggering an intermediate review between rational basis
and strict scrutiny analysis. Miss. Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 731 (1982)
(holding that a law discriminating on the basis of the male sex does not relieve it from the
heightened level of scrutiny); Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976) (describing the
appropriate level of review for gender classifications); Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S.
677, 682 (1973) (plurality opinion) (ruling that gender classifications are analogous to race
discrimination and therefore should be subjected to strict scrutiny).
27. The Supreme Court has rejected the notion that wealth (or lack of wealth) alone is
enough to trigger strict scrutiny. See San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S.
1, 2829 (1973) (concluding that poverty is not a suspect class and statutes challenged on this
basis will receive rational basis review); Edwards v. California, 314 U.S. 160, 18485 (1941)
(stating that “indigence in itself is a neutral fact—constitutionally an irrelevance, like race,
creed, or color.”). But see Harper v. Va. Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 670 (1966) (holding
that a poll tax in order to vote was unconstitutional), and Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 18
19 (1956) (holding that it violated equal protection to deny free trial transcripts to indigent
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status of nonmarital children.28 Many states also created durational residency
restrictions to control the skyrocketing state welfare rolls and the belief that
people migrated across state lines in pursuit of the most generous monthly
welfare payment.29 Under most state regulations, in order to be eligible for aid,
a person had to be a resident of the county/state for at least a year.30 In effect,
states could deny otherwise eligible persons aid simply because they had failed
to live in the geographical area for the minimum statutory period of time.31
When the state took such action, the Supreme Court reviewed the law to
determine if the groups of people identified by the law were a protected class,
or if the law violated a fundamental interest or right guaranteed by the
Constitution.32
By way of example, in the case of Shapiro, the Supreme Court was asked
to determine the constitutionality of conditioning receipt of welfare aid on
residency restrictions.33 Single Black mothers challenged the residency
requirements of Connecticut, the District of Columbia, and Pennsylvania.34
Pursuant to their welfare policy, respective states denied single mothers
benefits under AFDC if they resided in the state for less than one year.35
Congress had authorized this residency restriction36 and, therefore, the states’
welfare policies were in compliance with federal law.37

criminal defendants). For a discussion suggesting that claims made based on discrimination
against the poor should receive strict scrutiny, see Stephen Loffredo, Poverty, Democracy
and Constitutional Law, 141 U. PA. L. REV. 1277, 1278 (1993).
28. Similar to gender classification, the Supreme Court has been reticent to apply strict
scrutiny to cases involving discriminatory treatment on the basis of illegitimacy. However,
the Supreme Court has admonished states not to favor “legitimate” children over
“illegitimate” children. N.J. Welfare Rights Org. v. Cahill, 411 U.S. 619, 621 (1973); Gomez
v. Perez, 409 U.S. 535, 538 (1973); Weber v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 406 U.S. 164, 176
(1972); Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68, 72 (1968).
29. For an example of residence requirements and voting restrictions, see e.g., Dunn v.
Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 360 (1972) (striking down a Tennessee statute which required a
one year residence in the state as a condition for voting).
30. See Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 627 (1969).
31. KENNETH NEUBECK & NOEL A. CAZENAVE, WELFARE RACISM: PLAYING THE RACE
CARD AGAINST AMERICA’S POOR 61 (2001).
32. See Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 627 (1969).
33. Id.
34. Id.; see also Ernest N. Blasingame, Jr., Comment, Public Welfare and Public
Housing: Due Process and Equal Protection Standards, 38 TENN. L. REV. 345, 347 (1971).
35. Shapiro, 394 U.S. at 62327; see also DAVIS, supra note 6, at 77.
36. For background on the history of residency restrictions in welfare policy, see
James R. Kristy, Note and Comment, A Showdown Between Shapiro and the Personal
Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act: Infringement of the Right to
Travel, 20 WHITTIER L. REV. 449, 45264 (1998).
37. 42 U.S.C § 602(b) (1958); Shapiro, 394 U.S. at 639. According to A.P. van der
Mei, the states in the case argued that the real issue in Shapiro was whether Congress had the
authority to authorize states to impose residency requirements. A.P. van der Mei, Freedom of
Movement for Indigents: A Comparative Analysis of American Constitutional Law and
European Community Law, 19 ARIZ. J. INT’L & COMP. LAW 803, 818 (2002).
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The Supreme Court granted a victory to the welfare rights movement
when it struck down the residency requirement statute as an unconstitutional
violation of the Equal Protection Clause and the fundamental right to travel.38
The Supreme Court found that conditioning welfare benefits on residency
requirements “create[d] a classification which constitute[d] an invidious
discrimination denying . . . [welfare recipients] equal protection of the laws”39
and impinged upon their fundamental right to travel.40 While Supreme Court
decisions on the right to travel have varied, the core underpinnings of travel as
a fundamental right can be found within the meaning of the Equal Protection
Clause.41 Legal scholar A.P. van der Mei notes that “the personal right to move
freely from state to state is a product of this political Union and it occupies
within the constitutional system ‘a more protected’” status.42
While the Supreme Court in Shapiro recognized the state’s interest in
preserving the integrity of its programs—saving money and keeping its welfare
rolls down—the Supreme Court ruled that residency requirements were
unconstitutional because they failed to meet the “stricter standard of whether it
promotes a compelling state interest,”43 and served “‘no other purpose . . . than
to chill the assertion of constitutional rights by penalizing those who chose to
exercise them . . . .’” 44 In applying the more heightened level of review, the
Supreme Court took into account the socioeconomic context where the
modernization of agricultural labor pushed many unskilled farm laborers to
urban and northern communities in search of employment.45 When jobs were
unavailable, the only means of subsistence was the local welfare program.46
38. Shapiro, 394 U.S. at 638.
39. Id. at 627.
40. Id. at 638.
41. Jide Nzelibe, Free Movement: A Federalist Interpretation, 49 AM. U. L. REV. 433
(1999). See also C. Thomas Dienes, To Feed the Hungry: Judicial Retrenchment in Welfare
Adjudication, 58 CAL. L. REV. 555, 593600 (1970); Bernard Evans Harvith, Federal Equal
Protection and Welfare Assistance, 31 ALB. L. REV. 210, 22226 (1967).
42. A.P. van der Mei, supra note 37, at 811 (quoting Edwards v. California, 314 U.S.
160, 177 (1941)).
43. Shapiro, 394 U.S. at 638 (emphasis omitted).
44. Id. at 631 (quoting United States v. Jackson, 390 U.S. 570, 581 (1968)).
45. See generally Judith E. Koons, Motherhood, Marriage, and Morality: The Pro
Marriage Moral Discourse of American Welfare Policy, 19 WIS. WOMEN’S L.J. 1, 39 (2004)
(discussing the general movement towards industrialization).
46.
[A] State may no more try to fence out those indigents who seek higher welfare
benefits than it may try to fence out indigents generally. Implicit in any such
distinction is the notion that indigents who enter a State with the hope of
securing higher welfare benefits are somehow less deserving than indigents who
do not take this consideration into account. But we do not perceive why a mother
who is seeking to make a new life for herself and her children should be
regarded as less deserving because she considers, among others [sic] factors, the
level of a State's public assistance. Surely such a mother is no less deserving
than a mother who moves into a particular State in order to take advantage of its
better educational facilities.
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The Supreme Court found that the oneyear waiting period created two
categories of eligible recipients who were distinguished by the number of
months they had resided in the respective states47 and ruled that “any
classification which serves to penalize the exercise of that right [to travel],
unless shown to be necessary to promote a compelling [state] interest is
unconstitutional.”48 Scholars Kenneth Neubeck and Noel Cazenave argue that if
the Supreme Court had sustained state residency requirements, many citizens
would have had no means of livelihood.49 Therefore, in Shapiro, the Supreme
Court was unwilling to apply a lower level of scrutiny and refused to accept the
states’ contention that (1) the states’ objectives justified imposing a residency
restriction and (2) that any rational relationship existed between these identified
states’ objectives and implementation of the waiting periods.50
Most states that employed residency requirements and similar strategies
did so under the guise of preserving their welfare resources for residents of the
state.51 The state of Connecticut argued in Shapiro that the statutory residency
requirement was necessary “to protect its fisc[al budget] by discouraging entry
to those who come needing relief.”52 In response to the state’s arguments, the
Supreme Court opined,
We recognize that a State has a valid interest in preserving the fiscal
integrity of its programs. It may legitimately attempt to limit its
expenditures, whether for public assistance, public education, or any

Shapiro, 394 U.S. at 63132.
47. The Court stated:
There is no dispute that the effect of the waitingperiod requirement in each case
is to create two classes of needy resident families indistinguishable from each
other except that one is composed of residents who have resided a year or more,
and the second of residents who have resided less than a year, in the jurisdiction.
On the basis of this sole difference the first class is granted and the second class
is denied welfare aid upon which may depend the ability of the families to obtain
the very means to subsist  food, shelter, and other necessities of life.
Id. at 627.
48. Id. at 634 (emphasis omitted).
49. NEUBECK & CAZENAVE, supra note 31, at 61; see also Shapiro, 394 U.S. at 627.
The effect of [residency restrictions] is to create two classes of needy resident
families indistinguishable from each other except that one is composed of
residents who have resided a year or more, and the second of residents who have
resided less than a year, in the jurisdiction. On the basis of this sole difference
the first class is granted and the second class is denied welfare aid upon which
may depend the ability of the families to obtain the very means to subsist—food,
shelter, and other necessities of life.
Id.
50. Shapiro, 394 U.S. at 634.
51. Id. at 623.
52. Id. (quoting Thompson v. Shapiro, 270 F. Supp. 331 (D. Conn. 1967)).
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other program. But a State may not accomplish such a purpose by
invidious distinctions between classes of its citizens.53
The Supreme Court also held that it was unconstitutional to discriminate
against eligible poor citizens who migrated to a state seeking welfare benefits
and additionally hinted at an affirmative duty for states to redress economic
inequalities.54 While Shapiro did not declare that welfare entitlement was a
constitutional right or “fundamental interest” under Supreme Court case law,
access to welfare benefits eventually did become a legal entitlement via
Goldberg v. Kelly,55 which for a short time guaranteed some constitutional
protection for welfare recipients.56
The Equal Protection Clause has also been used in the welfare law arena
to invalidate a state’s acts of discrimination based on gender.57 In statebased
welfare legislation, genderbased discrimination occurred because the mother
usually served as the sole economic provider (in contrast to the traditional male
breadwinner model).58 Such a model went beyond the world of welfare to
reinforce various gendered divisions of labor where, for example, men were
given a higher wage (termed the family wage) with the presumption that “he”
was supporting a family or where men were seen as more aggressive and hard
working employees.59 This model never took into account the additional “home
work” for women that affect the differential in male and female productivity in
the workplace.
Yet such gendered assumptions pervaded the distribution and management
of welfare benefits as well. In Califano v. Westcott, the Supreme Court decided
to eliminate genderbased discrimination in an effort to equalize state
protections between unemployed mothers and fathers. 60 Aid to Families with
Dependent Children – Unemployed Father (AFDC – UF) was a federally
sponsored program that provided welfare to families with an unemployed
father, but denied benefits for an unemployed mother.61 After recent
unemployment, two families in which women served as the primary
breadwinner applied for and were denied AFDCUF benefits because the
husbands did not qualify as “unemployed” fathers under the Act.62 Both of the

53. Id. at 633.
54. Gunther, supra note 17, at 39.
55. Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 262 (1970).
56. See Goldberg, 397 U.S. at 261; Shapiro, 394 U.S. at 634; King v. Smith, 392 U.S.
309, 32427 (1968).
57. Califano v. Westcott, 443 U.S. 76, 85 (1979) (Powell, J., concurring).
58. See Califano, 443 U.S. at 8182; Karl E. Klare, Toward New Strategies for Low
Wage Workers, 4 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 245, 261–62 (1995); Lucie E. White, Closing the Care
Gap That Welfare Left Behind, 577 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 131, 134 (2001).
59. White, supra note 58, at 13435.
60. Califano, 443 U.S. at 76.
61. 42 U.S.C. § 607 (1935).
62. Califano, 443 U.S. at 8081.
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applicants in Califano would have qualified for benefits if they were males.63 In
this case, the Supreme Court denounced this discriminatory statute as a
violation of the equal protection principles embedded in the Due Process
Clause of the Fifth Amendment.64 The Commonwealth of Massachusetts
argued that the gender distinctions were important to deter fraud by twoparent
families.65 The key language in this case turned on the Supreme Court’s belief
that the Massachusetts’s statute was founded on archaic principles, which
supported “sexual stereotypes”66 and “presume[d] the father has the ‘primary
responsibility to provide [for] a home and its essentials.’”67 The Supreme Court
concluded, “legislation that rest[s] on such presumptions, without more, cannot
survive [intermediate] scrutiny under the Due Process Clause of the Fifth
Amendment.”68 The objectives advanced by Massachusetts for genderbased
distinctions were rejected by the Supreme Court because they were not
substantially related to any significant government objective.69 Therefore, the
Supreme Court ruled that benefits under the AFDCUF program must be
available to unemployed mothers as well as unemployed fathers.70
The Due Process Clauses of both the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments
are equally important to a case analysis of welfare law and policy and are
intrinsically connected to the Equal Protection Clause. The Due Process Clause
not only provides protection for substantive rights, but also mandates
procedural safeguards before the government can restrict a citizen’s liberty,
life, or property.71 Once a substantive right has been identified by the Supreme
Court, procedural due process dictates that appropriate precautions must be
provided before the government may act in this constitutionally protected
area.72

63. Id.
64. Id. at 8389.
65. Id. at 83.
66. Id. at 81, 89 (quoting Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S. 268, 283 (1975)).
67. Id. at 89 (quoting Stanton v. Stanton, 421 U.S. 7, 10 (1975)).
68. Id. When the Supreme Court reviews cases using an intermediate level of scrutiny,
the government must show that the challenged classification—here, gender—serves an
important state interest and that the classification is substantially related to serving that
interest. See, e.g., Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976).
69. Califano, 443 U.S. at 88; see also Amy S. Cleghorn, Justice Harry A. Blackmun: A
Retrospective Consideration of the Justice’s Role in the Emancipation of Women, 25 SETON
HALL L. REV. 1176, 119196 (1995).
70. Califano, 443 U.S. at 89.
71. See generally Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925).
72. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 33435 (1976). The Supreme Court in
Mathews v. Eldridge, identified three distinct factors which must be considered in order to
determine whether “administrative procedures . . . are constitutionally sufficient.” Id. First,
the court considers private interests that are affected by the government action. Id. at 335.
Second, the court weighs the likelihood of an erroneous deprivation against the likelihood
that the additional safeguard will be needed. Id. Finally, the court considers any
government’s interest in curtailing fiscal and administrative burdens that additional
procedural safeguards might impose. Id.
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B. Procedural Due Process
In the area of welfare law and policy, the Social Security Act of 1935
(SSA) set up national standards for eligibility.73 However, states could
administer these standards in the ways they deemed appropriate.74 The
ambiguity that existed here partially stems from the original SSA’s lack of
clarity in defining welfare; is was either 1) a substantive right (which the poor
could demand in times of need) and thus entitled to due process protection or 2)
a privilege (which could be denied or restricted at the whim of the federal/state
governments). Ideally, if welfare benefits were a substantive right, procedural
due process required that the recipient received, at a bare minimum, a “fair
hearing” before she could be removed from the program.75 However, the reality
was that under most circumstances, procedural due process was not initiated
when a welfare mother’s continued eligibility was subjectively and summarily
evaluated.76 In fact, when it came to denying benefits to welfare mothers, most
procedures put in place could hardly have been said to reach the level of due
process required by the Fourteenth Amendment. However, the 1970 Supreme
Court decision Goldberg v. Kelly changed this.77
In Goldberg, welfare mothers in New York challenged the procedures
used to terminate welfare benefits.78 Under New York policy, a caseworker’s
mere doubts as to a welfare recipient’s eligibility were sufficient to suspend or
terminate the benefits, affording the recipient no safeguard against arbitrary and
unjustified denial of benefits.79 Upon request, a recipient could review the
caseworker’s official justifications in support of termination of welfare benefits
and ask for a hearing to contest the allegations, but only after benefits had been
discontinued.80 The Supreme Court addressed whether the Due Process Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment required that welfare mothers receive an

73. 42 U.S.C.S. § 607 (1935).
74. Califano, 443 U.S. at 79; see also King v. Smith, 392 U.S. 309, 31617 (1968).
75. Arlo Chase, Maintaining Procedural Protections for Welfare Recipients: Defining
Property for the Due Process Clause, 23 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 571, 572 (1997).
76. The Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution guarantee
each citizen the right to Due Process of law. This legal concept has been used to restrict or
limit the federal and state governments from enacting laws or conducting legal proceedings
which deprive citizens of fundamental fairness, justice and liberty. At a bare minimum, a
person must be given notice of proceedings and the opportunity to be heard. Chase, supra
note 75, at 57172; Stephen N. Subrin & A. Richard Dykstra, Notice and the Right to be
Heard: The Significance of Old Friends, 9 HARV. C.R.C.L. L. REV. 449, 45152 (1974).
77. Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 25859 (1970). For an examination of the U.S.
Supreme Court decisions defining the scope of the government's ability to terminate public
benefits, see Jim Moye, Can’t Stop the Hustle: The Department of Housing and Urban
Development’s “One Strike” Eviction Policy Fails to Get Drugs Out of America’s Projects,
23 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 275, 28283 (2003).
78. Goldberg, 397 U.S. at 25657.
79. Id.
80. Id. at 259, see also Risa E. Kaufman, Bridging the Federalism Gap: Procedural
Due Process and Race Discrimination in a Devolved Welfare System, 3 HASTINGS RACE &
POVERTY L.J. 1, 1618 (2005).
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evidentiary hearing before benefits were terminated, providing for the
continuation of benefits pending resolution of eligibility concerns.81 In order to
answer this question, the Supreme Court needed to determine whether welfare
was “more like ‘property’ [or more like] a ‘gratuity.’”82 If welfare was
considered property, the Constitution required that the government provide due
process of law before the property could be taken.83 Prior to the decision in
Goldberg, welfare benefits had been considered a privilege.84 The Supreme
Court declared earlier in Board of Regents v. Roth:
[T]he requirements of procedural Due Process apply only to the
deprivation of interests encompassed by the Fourteenth
Amendment’s protection of liberty and property. When protected
interests are implicated, the right to some kind of prior hearing is
paramount. But the range of interests protected by procedural Due
Process is not infinite.85
Therefore, procedural protections were only required when an analysis of
“whether the nature of the interest is one within the contemplation of the
‘liberty or property’ language of the Fourteenth Amendment” had been shown
to be violated.86 In an astonishing blow to conservative welfare reformists, the
Burger Court 87 ruled:
The constitutional challenge cannot be answered by an argument that
public assistance benefits are a ‘privilege’ and not a ‘right.’ . . . The
extent to which procedural due process must be afforded the recipient
is influenced by the extent to which he may be ‘condemned to suffer
grievous loss, . . . and depends upon whether the recipient’s interest
in avoiding that loss outweighs the governmental interest in summary
adjudication. . . . For qualified recipients, welfare provides the means
to obtain essential food, clothing, housing, and medical care. . . .
Thus the crucial factor in this context . . . is that termination of aid
pending resolution of a controversy over eligibility may deprive an

81. Goldberg, 397 U.S. at 261.
82. Id. at 262, 262 n.8. The Court stated in its opinion that “[s]uch benefits are a matter
of statutory entitlement for persons qualified to receive them. Their termination involves
state action that adjudicates important rights.” Id. at 262 (footnote omitted). This proposition
established the basis for the Court’s reference to welfare benefits as property in footnote
eight of the decision: “It may be realistic today to regard welfare entitlements as more like
‘property’ than a ‘gratuity.’ Much of the existing wealth in this country takes the form of
rights that do not fall within traditional commonlaw concepts of property.” Id. at 262 n.8.
83. Steven J. Eagle, Substantive Due Process and Regulatory Takings: A Reappraisal,
51 ALA. L. REV. 977, 97980 (2000).
84. MARK V. TUSHNET, RED, WHITE AND BLUE: A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 214 (1988).
85. Bd. of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 56970 (1972).
86. Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481 (1982).
87. It is important to note that Chief Justice Burger dissented from this ruling.
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eligible recipient of the very means by which to live while he waits.
Since he lacks independent resources, his situation becomes
immediately desperate.88
The Supreme Court declared that the entitlement to receive welfare was a
property right and as such, meaningful procedural safeguards consistent with
the Fourteenth Amendment must be implemented prior to taking that
property.89 While this decision was a resounding victory for welfare rights
advocates and at least suggested that the liberal activism of the Warren Court
might survive the transition to the Burger Court, it was not the final word. At
this time, the racial composition of those benefiting from welfare was
increasingly AfricanAmerican, and social welfare became even more
intimately tied to public metaphors of behavioral laziness and promiscuity,
which coincided with a moment of national fiscal insecurity.90 In addition, as
legal scholar Martha Davis noted, many of the dissenting justices in Goldberg
also refused at that time to declare welfare a fundamental right.91 Moreover, the
Supreme Court’s description of welfare as “more like ‘property’ than a
‘gratuity’”92 also provides evidence of the Supreme Court’s ambiguous stance
on welfare as a property right. The vague language of “more like” left the door
open to revisit the issue of welfare entitlement.
C. Equal Protection and Special Class Protection
As early as the 1970s, legislation and the rights of the poor in particular,
were vulnerable to the rising hegemony of the “moral majority” which argued
that entitlement to basic rights should be predicated on behavioral prescriptions
unrelated to actual need.93 The changing public sentiment translated into denial
of access to welfare benefits cloaked in arguments about greater deference
toward state’s rights. It was hardly surprising to see the welfare recipients94
challenge the family cap law95 in 1970. Equally not surprising the Supreme
Court declined to hold in Dandridge v. Williams that welfare was a

88. Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 26264 (1970).
89. Id. at 262 n.8; Handler, supra note 24, at 899. But see Mathews v. Eldridge, 424
U.S. 319, 33132 (1976) (restricting the right to a pretermination hearing in welfare benefits
cases under Goldberg's due process analysis).
90. See generally HANCOCK, supra note 4; HERBERT J. GANS, THE WAR AGAINST THE
POOR: THE UNDERCLASS AND ANTIPOVERTY POLICY (1996); THE UNDERCLASS DEBATE
(Michael B. Katz ed., 1993); MICHAEL B. KATZ, THE UNDESERVING POOR (1990).
91. DAVIS, supra note 6, at 10218. For a discussion of welfare benefits and
procedural due process in Goldberg, see Blasingame, supra note 34, at 34953.
92. Goldberg, 397 U.S. at 262 n.8.
93. See generally MATTHEW D. LASSITER, THE SILENT MAJORITY: SUBURBAN POLITICS
IN THE SUNBELT SOUTH (2007); LISA MCGIRR, SUBURBAN WARRIORS: THE ORIGINS OF THE
NEW AMERICAN RIGHT (2002)
94. Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471 (1970).
95. Family cap legislation allows a state to set a maximum amount of cash assistance
per family regardless of established need. Id. at 473.
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fundamental right and therefore welfare recipients were not a suspect class
entitled to special constitutional protection.96
In Dandridge, the state of Maryland provided welfare benefits for families
based upon calculating their “standard of financial need.”97 If a family had a
“standard of financial need” which was greater than $250 per month, the state
imposed a limit on the total amount that family could receive from AFDC. 98
The “family cap” rule was used to discourage mothers from continuing to have
children supported by welfare.99 Plaintiffs Linda Williams and Junius Gary
each had eight children and were financially destitute.100 If each member of
their respective families were counted individually their “standard of financial
need” would range from $296.00$331.00 per month.101 However, under
Maryland’s family cap rule both families were only eligible for $250.00 per
month.102 In this case, the welfare recipients charged that the maximum grant
regulation violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment.103 In this ruling, the Supreme Court appeared to compromise on
its previous inflexibility about welfare being an entitlement104 (via cooperative
federalism) and ruled that the “family cap” law, although discriminatory, did
not violate the Equal Protection Clause and was permissible social and
economic legislation.105 The Supreme Court reasoned: “[T]he Constitution does
not empower this court to secondguess state officials charged with the difficult
responsibility of allocating limited public welfare funds among the myriad of
potential recipients.”106 The plaintiffs in Dandridge argued that the family cap
legislation discriminated against a suspect class, and relying on the precedent of
Goldberg, argued that caps to welfare benefits violated a fundamental
constitutionally protected right.107 However, the Supreme Court did not
recognize such claims and, therefore, declined to review Maryland’s maximum
grant regulation under a strict scrutiny standard.108 The implication of lessening
the standard of judicial review was to uphold any rationale articulated by the
state that justified the imposition of family caps.
The above ruling demonstrates how the state’s welfare policy legislated a
bias for smaller families, yet the Supreme Court nonetheless upheld the statute.

96. Id. at 48586.
97. Id. at 473.
98. Id. In the city of Baltimore the maximum grant was $250, while outside of the city
of Baltimore the maximum grant was $240.00. Williams v. Dandridge, 297 F. Supp. 450,
453 (1968), rev’d, 397 U.S. 471 (1970).
99. Dandridge, 397 U.S. at 477.
100. Id. at 490.
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. Id. at 473.
104. Id. at 508 (1970) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
105. Id. at 48486.
106. Id. at 503.
107. Id. at 51923 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
108. Id. at 486.
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While the Constitution does not require that each citizen be treated identically
to satisfy the Equal Protection Clause, the level of judicial scrutiny will vary
based on whether a right is considered fundamental or a social group is a
suspect class (such as race).109 However, it is extremely difficult for a social
group to be identified by the Supreme Court as a suspect class. Consider the
Supreme Court’s decision in Harris v. McRae, 110 where the Hyde Amendment
was at issue.111 Under the Hyde Amendment, state Medicaid programs could
not use federal funds to pay for abortions for indigent women, unless the
mother’s life was in danger or the pregnancy was the result of rape or incest.112
Cora McRae, whose situation did not fit into either of the exceptions
authorizing Medicaid coverage, wanted to terminate her pregnancy. She was
pregnant, in her first trimester, and receiving welfare and Medicaid from the
state of New York.113 Ms. McRae argued that the Hyde Amendment denied her
equal protection under the law because it refused to fund abortions to those
who were eligible for Medicaid, while permitting Medicaid to cover the costs
associated with childbirth.114 Since the Hyde Amendment only restricted access

109. A suspect class is a group identified by their history of unequal treatment due to
immutable characteristics that result in position of political powerlessness. See City of
Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 440 (1985).
The general rule that legislation is presumed to be valid gives way when a
statute classifies by race, alienage, or national origin. These factors are so
seldom relevant to the achievement of any legitimate state interest that laws
grounded in such considerations are deemed to reflect prejudice and antipathy,
a view that those in the burdened class are not as worthy or deserving as others.
For these reasons and because such discrimination is unlikely to be soon
rectified by legislative means, these laws are subjected to strict scrutiny and will
be sustained only if they are suitably tailored to serve a compelling state interest.
Id.
110. 448 U.S. 297 (1980).
111. Id.; Hyde Amendment, Pub. L. No. 94439, 209, 90 Stat. 1418 (1976); Larry P.
Boyd, Comment, The Hyde Amendment: New Implications for Equal Protection Claims, 33
BAYLOR L. REV. 295, 295 (1981).
112. Harris, 448 U.S. at 303; see also Ken Agran, When Government Must Pay:
Compensating Rights and the Constitution, 22 CONST. COMMENT. 97, 12022 (2005)
(applying the theory of compensating rights to the abortion funding decisions in Maher v.
Roe and Harris v. McRae requiring the government to compensate for the coercive pressure
designed to persuade poor women to choose childbirth over abortion).
113. Harris, 448 U.S. at 303.
114. Id. McRae also argued that the Hyde Amendment violated
(1) the right of a woman, implicit in the Due Process Clause of the Fifth
Amendment, to decide whether to terminate a pregnancy, (2) the prohibition
under the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment against any ‘law
respecting an establishment of religion,’ and (3) the right to freedom of religion
protected by the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment.
Id. at 311.
The Supreme Court held:
Although the liberty protected by the Due Process Clause affords protection
against unwarranted government interference with freedom of choice in the
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to abortions for women who relied on Medicaid, McRae wanted the court to
recognize that poor mothers as a class represented a politically weak social
group which had suffered prejudicial treatment due to the immutable
characteristic of poverty, and this justified the designation of a suspect class
with a higher standard of review.115 Under such a heightened review, the
validity of the statute depended on whether the Hyde Amendment could
demonstrate that it furthered an essential government objective, was narrowly
tailored to achieve such objective, and the means employed were the least
restrictive to accomplish the intent of the legislation.116 If, however, the
Supreme Court determined that poor mothers were not a group in need of
special recognition as a suspect class, the validity of the Hyde Amendment
would be authorized if it could merely demonstrate that the enacted statute
reasonably and rationally furthered any legitimate state objective.
In this case, the Supreme Court reiterated that poverty is not a suspect
classification. The Supreme Court reasoned:
An indigent woman desiring an abortion does not come within the
limited category of disadvantaged classes so recognized by our cases.
Nor does the fact that the impact of the regulation falls upon those
who cannot pay lead to a different conclusion. In a sense, every
denial of welfare to an indigent creates a wealth classification as
compared to nonindigents who are able to pay for the desired goods

context of certain personal decisions, it does not confer an entitlement to such
funds as may be necessary to realize all the advantages of that freedom. To hold
otherwise would mark a drastic change in our understanding of the Constitution.
. . . To translate the limitation on governmental power implicit in the Due
Process Clause into an affirmative funding obligation would require Congress to
subsidize the medically necessary abortion of an indigent woman even if
Congress had not enacted a Medicaid program to subsidize other medically
necessary services. Nothing in the Due Process Clause supports such an
extraordinary result. Whether freedom of choice that is constitutionally protected
warrants federal subsidization is a question for Congress to answer, not a matter
of constitutional entitlement. Accordingly, we conclude that the Hyde
Amendment does not impinge on the due process liberty recognized in [Roe v.]
Wade.
Id. at 31718.
115. Id. at 301303. Although the District Court concluded that the Hyde Amendment
discriminated against teenage mothers who were a suspect class, the Supreme Court
concluded that the Hyde Amendment did not single out recipients based on age and that
regardless of age, funding for abortions would only be allowed in cases of medical necessity,
rape or incest. Therefore, in order to warrant judicial review under strict scrutiny, McRae
would be required “to prove that Congress ‘selected or reaffirmed a particular course of
action at least in part ‘because of,’ not merely ‘in spite of,’ its adverse effects upon an
identifiable group.’” Id. at 323 (quoting Pers. Adm’r of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 279
(1979)).
116. See supra note 18 and accompanying text.
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or services. But this Court has never held that financial need alone
identifies a suspect class for purposes of equal protection analysis.117
The Hyde Amendment did discriminate by distinguishing levels of
benefits between two classes of poor mothers.118 However, under the lowest
level of judicial review, the Supreme Court concluded that the means employed
(denying funds to pay for abortions for Medicaid recipients) was rationally and
reasonably related to meet the state’s legitimate interest.119 The Supreme Court
denied welfare recipients access to financially supported abortions (even
though the state paid for expenses relating to childbirth) holding that “[a]n
indigent woman who desires an abortion suffers no disadvantage as a
consequence of [a state’s] decision to fund childbirth.”120
The Supreme Court added that the Constitution or any case interpreting
constitutional rights (i.e., Roe v. Wade) did not require constitutional
entitlement to financial resources, especially if the barrier (to exercise the
constitutional right) was not one “of its own creation.”121 While the Supreme
Court did recognize the fundamental right to choose to have a child, McRae
made it clear that there was no right to abortion at the government’s expense.122
Within the emerging welfare policy, the choices that women could make with
their bodies were heavily circumscribed by their access to financial
resources.123 Moreover, notwithstanding intergenerational dependency
arguments,124 the decision by the Supreme Court was wholly inconsistent with
support of restrictive “family cap” legislation discussed earlier in Dandridge or
even the dangerous and racially targeted eugenics arguments put forth to limit
the number of illegitimate children decades earlier.125
D. Balance of Power Between the Judicial and Legislative Branches
On the surface, the next two cases, Saenz v. Roe and Legal Services v.
Velazquez, seem to be decisions which aggressively protected the rights of
welfare recipients and ruled in favor of their fundamental rights. Upon closer

117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.

Harris, 448 U.S. at 323 (quoting Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 47071).
See supra note 27 and accompanying text.
Harris, 448 U.S. at 323.
Id. at 314.
Id. at 316.
Id. at 30708.
See generally DOROTHY E. ROBERTS, KILLING THE BLACK BODY: RACE,
REPRODUCTION AND THE MEANING OF LIBERTY (Vintage 1st ed. 1999).
124. See, e.g., DANIEL PATRICK MOYNIHAN, THE NEGRO FAMILY: THE CASE FOR
NATIONAL ACTION (1965), reprinted in LEE RAINWATER & WILLIAM L. YANCEY, THE
MOYNIHAN REPORT AND THE POLITICS OF CONTROVERSY 75 (1967).
125. Lisa Powell, Note, Eugenics and Equality: Does the Constitution Allow Policies
Designed To Discourage Reproduction Among Disfavored Groups?, 20 YALE L. & POL'Y
REV. 481, 50207 (2002); Nicole Huberfeld, Recent Development, Three Generations of
Welfare Mothers Are Enough: A Disturbing Return to Eugenics in the Recent “Workfare”
Law, 9 UCLA WOMEN’S L.J. 98, 128 ( 1998).
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examination, however, it is clear that these cases were actually struggles for
power between the Supreme Court and Congress, where welfare recipients
became unintended beneficiaries. Here it appears that the main goal was not to
benefit welfare recipients but to maintain checks and balances between the
legislative and judicial branches of government.
A perfect example of this power struggle is Saenz v. Roe,126 a case which
came on the heels of the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity
Reconciliation Act of 1996 (PRWORA) and the welfare reform agenda.127
Thirty years prior to this case, in Shapiro,128 the Supreme Court ruled that
residency restrictions under AFDC violated the fundamental right to travel.129
In order to comply with Shapiro, most states eliminated or altered the time
period that indigent mothers had to wait in order to receive benefits.130 Unlike
the residency requirement in Shapiro—where the state denied benefits to
eligible new residents unless they resided in the state for one year—California
established a residency policy which created a sliding scale for benefits based
on the time a family had lived in the state.131 In an effort to escape abusive
domestic relationships, the three women in Saenz v. Roe case moved to
California.132 Once in California they applied for AFDC and were informed that
under California law if welfare benefits in California exceeded those in the
prior state of residence, the recipients would receive a reduced amount for one
year.133 California argued unsuccessfully that unlike Shapiro the welfare policy
here did not impose on the fundamental right to travel because individuals were
not denied access to welfare benefits.134 Further, financial restraint justified
reducing welfare benefits.135 And last, under the new welfare reform legislation
Congress had granted the state the authority to set the residency requirement.136

126. 526 U.S. 489 (1999).
127. Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act, 42 U.S.C. §
1305 (2000).
128. Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969).
129. Id. at 638.
130. See A.P. van der Mei, supra note 37, at 821; Wisconsin had a sixty day waiting
period. Id. at 821 (citing WIS. STAT. § 49.19(11m) (1992)). Minnesota reduced benefits of
those who resided less than six months. Id. (citing MINN. STAT. § 256D.065 (1991)). In
California benefits could not exceed those obtain in the prior state of residence. Id. (citing
CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 11450.03 (1994)).
131. Saenz, 526 U.S. at 493. For background and analysis of the implications of the
court decision in this case, see Erica K. Nelson, Unanswered Questions: The Implications of
Saenz v. Roe for Durational Residency Requirements, 49 KAN. L. REV. 193 (2000) and Dan
Wolff, Right Road, Wrong Vehicle?: Rethinking Thirty Years of Right to Travel Doctrine:
Saenz v. Roe, 119 S. Ct. 1518 (1999), 25 DAYTON L. REV. 307 (2000).
132. Saenz, 526 U.S. at 493.
133. Id. at 494.
134. Id. at 500.
135. Id. at 497.
136. 42 U.S.C. § 604(c) (1994).
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PRWORA had in fact explicitly authorized states to limit welfare benefits to
families who had resided in the state for less than one year.137
Reaffirming the “principles” established in Shapiro, the Supreme Court
ruled that the residency restriction in California was unconstitutional and
violated the fundamental and constitutional right to travel.138 Supreme Court
explained that:
[T]he right to travel . . . embraces at least three different components.
It protects the right of a citizen of one State to enter and to leave
another State, the right to be treated as a welcome visitor rather than
an unfriendly alien when temporarily present in the second State and,
for those travelers who elect to become permanent residents, the right
to be treated like other citizens of that State.139
While the Supreme Court acknowledged that California’s welfare policy
did not impact a person’s freedom of movement, it found that California’s
policy violated the right of new residents to be treated as equal citizens of the
state.140 Therefore, “[w]hat is at issue in this case, . . . [is] the right of the newly
arrived citizen to the same privileges and immunities enjoyed by other citizens
of the same State.”141 The Supreme Court also warned that under the laws of
the country, it is the citizens who make up the citizenry of a state and not the
states who choose its citizens.142 While great deference was given to state laws,
these laws must also yield to the Constitution.143 In its concluding remarks the
Supreme Court noted that:
Citizens of the United States, whether rich or poor, have the right to
choose to be citizens “of the state wherein they reside.” The States,
however, do not have any right to select their citizens. The
Fourteenth Amendment, like the Constitution itself, was, as Justice
Cardozo put it, “framed upon the theory that the peoples of the

137. Id.
138. Saenz, 526 U.S. at 499.
139. Id. at 500.
140. Id. at 502.
141. Id. For scholarly debates on the Supreme Court decision in Saenz v. Roe, see Tim
A. Lemper, Recent Case, The Promise and Perils of “Privileges or Immunities”: Saenz v.
Roe, 119 S. Ct. 1518 (1999), 23 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 295 (1999); Kevin
Maher, Comment, Like a Phoenix from the Ashes: Saenz v. Roe, The Right to Travel, and
the Resurrection of the Privileges or Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, 33
TEX. TECH L. REV. 105 (2001); Bradley A. Meyer, Case Comment, Constitutional Law —
Right to Travel: The United States Supreme Court Invalidates a Statute Requiring Welfare
Recipients to Reside in a State For One Year Before Receiving Full Benefits Saenz v. Roe,
526 U.S. 489 (1999), 76 N. DAK. L. REV. 427 (2000).
142. Saenz, 526 U.S. at 511 (quoting Baldwin v. G.A.F. Seeling, Inc., 294 U.S. 511,
523 (1935)).
143. Id.
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several states must sink or swim together, and that in the long run
prosperity and salvation are in union and not division.”144
The Supreme Court further noted that while preserving state resources is a
justifiable goal, California can not legitimately accomplish that goal by
discriminating between citizens.145 The Supreme Court concluded the
following:
[T]he question is not whether such saving is a legitimate purpose but
whether the State may accomplish that end by the discriminatory
means it has chosen. . . . But our negative answer to the question
does not rest on the weakness of the State’s purported fiscal
justification. It rests on the fact that the Citizenship Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment expressly equates citizenship with residence:
“That Clause does not provide for, and does not allow for, degrees of
citizenship based on length of residence.”146
The Supreme Court admonished that even if Congress had authorized
California to impose residency restrictions:
[Congressional] legislative powers are however limited not only by
the scope of the Framer’s affirmative delegation, but also by the
principle “that they may not be exercised in a way that violates other
specific provisions of the constitution.” . . . Congress has no
affirmative power to authorize the states to violate the Fourteenth
Amendment and is implicitly prohibited from passing legislation that
purports to validate any such violation.147
Essentially, this passage was one of the Supreme Court’s clearest
articulations of the limited powers of Congress. Here the Supreme Court stated
that any attempt by Congress to allow states to set residency restrictions was in
violation of the Constitution.148 The Supreme Court’s reading of the boundaries
of the Constitution continually served as a powerful force in restricting the
reach of Congressional decisionmaking in welfare policymaking.
Legal Services v. Velazquez further crystallized how the struggle between
Congress and the Supreme Court unintentionally encouraged the Supreme
Court to argue that welfare rights were a fundamental right. The Legal Service
Corporation (LSC), which was created by the Legal Service Corporation Act,

144. Id.
145. Id. at 506 (quoting Zoble v. Williams, 457 U.S. 55, 69 (1982)).
146. Id.
147. Id. at 508 (quoting Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23, 29 (1968)).
148. Id. See also Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 641 (1969) (holding that
“Congress is without power to enlist state cooperation in a joint federalstate program by
legislation which authorizes the States to violate the Equal Protection Clause.”) (citing
Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 651, n.10 (1966)).
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provided funding to organizations that assisted lower income citizens with legal
matters unrelated to criminal law.149 In 1996 the Omnibus Consolidated
Rescissions and Appropriations Act prohibited funds granted through the LSC
to be used by litigants for purposes of “amending or otherwise challenging
existing [welfare] law in effect on the date of the initiation of the
representation.”150 In Legal Services, the LSC argued that this provision was
invalid because the restriction denied welfare mothers the right to counsel in
order to object to unconstitutional or conflicting welfare laws and policies.151
The Supreme Court held that it was unconstitutional for Congress to
provide funds for legal counsel to welfare mothers on the condition that those
funds were not used to challenge the authority of Congressional welfare
policy.152 Further, the Supreme Court found that it was impermissible for
Congress to assume the traditional role of review afforded to the judicial
branch.153 Additionally, the Supreme Court noted that such a statute interfered
with the “‘unfettered interchange of ideas [used] for the bringing about of
political and social changes desired by the people’” and therefore violated the
fundamental rights of the First Amendment.154 The Supreme Court continued:
Interpretation of the law and the Constitution is the primary mission
of the judiciary when it acts within the sphere of its authority to
resolve a case or controversy . . . . “It is emphatically the province
and the duty of the judicial department to say what the law is.” An
informed, independent judiciary presumes an informed, independent
bar. Under § 504(a)(16), however, cases would be presented by LSC
attorneys who could not advise the courts of serious questions of
statutory validity. . . . By seeking to prohibit the analysis of certain
legal issues and to truncate presentation to the courts, the enactment
under review prohibits speech and expression upon which courts
must depend for the proper exercise of the judicial power. Congress
cannot wrest the law from the Constitution which is its source . . . .

149. 42 U.S.C. § 2996 (1974).
150. Id.
151. Legal Services v. Velazquez, 531 U.S. 533, 548 (2001); see also Rust v. Sullivan,
500 U.S. 173, 173 (1991) (upholding Section 1008 of the Public Health Service Act which
precluded federal funds from being used to provide “counseling concerning, referrals for,
and activities advocating abortion as a method of family planning, and require such projects
to maintain an objective integrity and independence from the prohibited abortion activities
by the use of separate facilities, personnel, and accounting records.”); Arthur N. Eisenberg,
The Brooklyn Museum Controversy and the Issue of GovernmentFunded Expression, 66
BROOK. L. REV. 275 (2000) (discussing government funded expression and first amendment
principles).
152. Velazquez, 531 U.S. at 54546.
153. Id.
154. Id at 548 (quoting N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 269 (1964)).
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The restriction imposed by the statute here threatens severe
impairment of the judicial function.155
While Legal Services could be viewed as another victory for welfare
mothers, the Supreme Court’s opinion and strong dissent by Justice Scalia
made it clear that welfare mothers had merely reaped the benefits of this more
general debate over Congressional authority in a moment heavily governed by
(when it came to the poor) a rising fiscal conservatism and personal
responsibility. Consider, for example, Justice Scalia’s dissenting opinion where
he argued that an indigent welfare mother would not be deterred from bringing
a lawsuit simply because she cannot be represented by the LSC, since the
indigent welfare mother would simply have to hire a lawyer who did not work
for LSC.156 And even if it did mean fewer statutory challenges to welfare laws,
“so what? . . . [T]he welfare recipient [is] in no worse condition than she
would have been in had the LSC program never been enacted.”157 Theoretically
this was true, since everyone had access to the Supreme Court. But, in the
context of this situation and the reality of poverty, LSC would be the only
feasible option for these welfare recipients.
Despite the Supreme Court’s signature endorsement here of procedural
due process, equal protection under the law, and fundamental rights, there are
still other cases decided on welfare law which signal the Supreme Court’s
retreat from ruling in a manner which afforded welfare recipients a more
complete granting of constitutional rights.158 These legal cases would
reorganize the working power relationship between the state and federal
government.
II.

FEDERALISM

One of the key features of the Constitution is its focus on federalism (or,
its explanation of what role and exactly how much authority the federal
government could take from the states).159 Scholar Andrew McLaughlin
defined federalism as a “system of political order in which powers of the
government are separated and distinguished and in which these powers are
distributed among governments, each government having its quota of authority
and each its distinct sphere of activity.”160 Within the federalist relationship, the

155. Id. at 54546.
156. Id. at 55657 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
157. Id.
158. See, e.g., Van Lare v. Hurley, 421 U.S. 338 (1975); King v. Smith, 392 U.S. 309
(1968).
159. See WAYNE D. MOORE, CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS AND POWERS OF THE PEOPLE
(1996); LAWRENCE FRIEDMAN, AMERICAN LAW: AN INTRODUCTION (1984); Richard E. Levy
& Stephen R. McAllister, Federalism in the 21st Century: Defining the Roles of the National
and State Governments in the American Federal System, 45 KAN. L. REV. 971, 97172
(1997).
160. Andrew C. McLaughlin, The Background of American Federalism, 12 AM. POL.
SCI. REV. 215, 215 (1918).
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courts serve a regulating function, using the Constitution to mediate the
relationship between state and national governments.161
However, the question still remains as to what specific role the Supreme
Court has in this complex matrix of mediation. In the case of welfare law, the
Supreme Court was the instrument used by working poor and specifically
working class Black women to challenge acts of discrimination implemented
through state policies.162 When it came to distribution of welfare funds, state
and local government officials were paternalistically involved in the lives of
lowincome Black mothers.163 As in larger Civil Rights struggles, the call for
“states’ rights” became the perfect foil to implement and enforce “separate and
unequal” under the law.164 In most cases, without the intervention of the
Supreme Court Black mothers were “at greater risk of being discriminated
against because of personal and institutional race bias.”165
In the context of welfare and federalism, it was also clear that the Supreme
Court was limited in what could be offered by its legal decisions. Scholar
Polyvois G. Polyviou notes, “[t]he Constitution does not provide judicial
remedies for every social and economic ill.”166 However, the Supreme Court’s
role did regulate “appropriate” levels of power between state and federal
governments. Under different theories of federalism, the federal or state
government may hold stronger control over issues relating to, for example,
welfare, health, and/or education.167 Therefore, decisions by the Supreme Court
fluctuate between ideas of “cooperative federalism” (preference for a
decentralized structure of government where state and federal institutions work
together to regulate policy implementation)168 to ideas of “new federalism”
(where federal government takes a hands off approach on matters relating to

161. Richard B. Stewart, Federalism: Allocating Responsibility Between the Federal
and State Courts, 19 GA. L. REV. 917, 918 (1985).
162. Levy & McAllister, supra note 159.
163. See DEBORAH WARD, THE WHITE WELFARE STATE: THE RACIALIZATION OF U.S.
WELFARE POLICY (2005); JILL QUADAGNO, THE COLOR OF WELFARE: HOW RACISM
UNDERMINED THE WAR ON POVERTY (1994); NEUBECK & CAZENAVE, supra note 31.
164. KEVIN KRUSE, WHITE FLIGHT: ATLANTA AND THE MAKING OF MODERN
CONSERVATISM (2007).
165. Risa E. Kaufman, supra note 80, at 15.
166. POLYVIOS G. POLYVIOU, THE EQUAL PROTECTION OF THE LAWS 217 (1980).
167. For a discussion of cooperative federalism, see Philip J. Weiser, Cooperative
Federalism and Its Challenges, 2003 MICH. ST. DCL L. REV. 727, 729 (2003).
A critical advantage of a cooperative federalism approach is that it sets forth a
basic federal framework while allowing states to experiment within certain
contours . . . respecting longstanding state interests and autonomy . . .
facilitating local participation and greater accountability for public policies . . .
allowing for local experimentation and interstate competition . . . and . . . relying
on the economy of local agencies (rather than creating or expanding a national
bureaucracy.)
Id.
168. Weiser, supra note 167, at 73031.
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state governance).169 This section will examine some Supreme Court decisions
through the lens of federalism and see how changes in the inquiry of federal
state relationships affected welfare law decisions.
The “War on Poverty,” officially waged in August 1964, was an ambitious
legislative effort to address the problem of a persistent racialized poverty in
America.170 Over the next decade, the federal government (in conjunction with
state and local governments, nonprofits, and grassroots organizations) created
a new institutional infrastructure for antipoverty and civil rights action.171
Characterized alternatively as times of consensus and controversy,172 this
antipoverty and civil rights agenda highlighted growing ideological and racial
tensions in American society. Congress felt discomfort in the realization that
after all their declarations of equality, it was evident that some citizens were
“more equal” than others.173
While there was national consensus building around the idea that poverty
was a problem in need of eradication or at least deserving of vigorous attention,
there was less agreement in Congress as to the cause and subsequent solution to
the problem.174 The increase in welfare rolls after the initiation of the War on
Poverty agenda encouraged many states to experiment with regulations to
control the growth and cost of their welfare programs.175 Many of these
restrictive measures— declaring a home “unsuitable” in order to deny benefits,
denying benefits under the “maninthehouse” rule, and establishing residency
requirements—predated the War on Poverty agenda and were heavily enforced
against poor Black mothers in particular.176 Some state legislation declared that,
for example, men who had sexual relationships with mothers on welfare were
financially responsible for them and their children.177 These “substitute parent”
regulations removed the mother from the roll regardless of whether the
“boyfriend” contributed to that family’s income.178 The following cases discuss

169. Irving L. Horowitz, From the New Deal to the New Federalism: Presidential
Ideology in the U.S. from 1932 to 1982, 42 AM. J. ECON. SOC. 129, 131 (1983).
170. ALLEN J. MATUSOW, THE UNRAVELING OF AMERICA: A HISTORY OF LIBERALISM IN
THE 1960S 11624 (1984).
171. FELICIA KORNBLUH, THE BATTLE FOR WELFARE RIGHTS: POLITICS AND POVERTY
IN MODERN AMERICA (2007); PREMILLA NADASEN, WELFARE WARRIORS: THE WELFARE
RIGHTS MOVEMENT IN THE UNITED STATES xivxvi (2004).
172. KORNBLUSH, supra note 171; NADASEN, supra note 171.
173. ALICE O’CONNOR, POVERTY KNOWLEDGE: SOCIAL SCIENCE, SOCIAL POLICY, AND
THE POOR IN TWENTIETHCENTURY U.S. HISTORY (2001).
174. Id.
175. NEUBECK & CAZENAVE, supra note 31, at 59.
176. GERTRUDE SCHAFFNER GOLDBERG & SHEILA D. COLLINS, WASHINGTON’S NEW
POOR LAW: WELFARE REFORM AND THE ROADS NOT TAKEN, 1935 TO THE PRESENT 20 (2000).
Goldberg and Collins argued that most restrictions, such as the “suitable home” requirements
were attempts by states to deny aid to poor Black women and children. Id.
177. Nineteen states and the District of Columbia had maninthehouse rules. King v.
Smith, 392 U.S. 309, 337 (1968) (Douglas, J., concurring).
178. Id. at 314; NEUBECK & CAZENAVE, supra note 31, at 60.
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these types of regulations and reveal that the Supreme Court articulated and
maintained a dominant federal government presence over welfare legislation
King v. Smith challenged the constitutionality of state restrictions that
deviated from the federal mandates outlined in the SSA.179 As one of the first
cases to reach the Supreme Court, King came through the federal courts
because state courts were hostile to the interest of the poor and especially Black
people, as the primary beneficiaries of the increased welfare rolls during the
late 1960s.180 Mrs. Sylvester Smith, a Black mother of four children, received
AFDC to supplement the sixteen to twenty dollars she earned weekly working
as a waitress.181 Her welfare benefits were terminated because it was alleged
that “Mr. [Willie E.] Williams came to her home on weekends and had sexual
relations with her.”182 Based upon this description of Mrs. Smith and Mr.
Williams’s relationship alone, Mr. Williams was classified as a “substituted
father.”183 Alabama’s regulation denied benefits to families who had a
“substitute father.”184
Alabama argued that its motivations for the “substitute father” rule were
to preserve the spirit of morality and worthiness embodied in its welfare law
provisions.185 Further, Alabama stressed that it was unfair to allow sexually
active, unmarried and immoral mothers who refused to marry to receive
benefits over those married mothers in the same economic situations.186
Unimpressed by this rationale, the Supreme Court concluded that Alabama’s
standards of morality were clearly outdated and concluded that “it is simply
inconceivable . . . that Alabama is free to discourage immortality and
illegitimacy by the device of absolute disqualification of needy children.”187
In a unanimous decision, the Supreme Court relied on the doctrine of
“cooperative federalism” to knock down the “substitute father” rule.188 Under

179. King, 392 U.S. at 309.
180. DAVIS, supra note 6, at 60.
181. King, 392 U.S. at 315.
182. Id.
183. Id. Under substitute father provisions, otherwise eligible mothers were removed
from the rolls if the social worker concluded that they were inappropriately associating with
a man or if a man was found inside the recipient’s home. Such regulations would be
enforced through frequent unannounced nighttime raids. See Tonya L. Brito, From Madonna
to Proletariat: Constructing a New Ideology of Motherhood in Welfare Discourse, 44 VILL.
L. REV. 415, 423 n.51 (1999).
184. King, 392 U.S. at 315. In 1964, Governor George Wallace approved the substitute
father rule which removed over 14,000 Black children from the welfare rolls in Alabama.
William E. Forbath, Not So Simple Justice: Frank Michelman on Social Rights, 39 TULSA L.
REV. 597, 606 (2004).
185. King, 392 U.S. at 320.
186. Id. at 32027.
187. Id. at 325. “[S]ubsequent developments clearly establish that these state interests
are not presently justifications for AFDC disqualification. Insofar as this or any similar
regulation is based on the state’s asserted interest in discouraging illicit sexual behavior and
illegitimacy, it plainly conflicts with federal law and policy.” Id. at 320.
188. Id. at 316.
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the doctrine of “cooperative federalism” states were free to administer their
respective AFDC programs to reflect whatever goals and philosophies needed
to assist and serve the poor.189 However, state programs were still bound by
federalstate financing arrangements, and state standards had to be consistent
with the Constitution as well as federal regulations and statutes. The Supreme
Court determined that Alabama’s definition of parent conflicted with the SSA,
and “any state law or regulation inconsistent with such federal terms and
conditions is to that extent invalid.”190 Therefore, in order to continue to receive
money from the federal government to assist in financing its AFDC programs,
the state could not impose a maninthehouse rule.191
The King case demonstrates a conceptual shift in Supreme Court welfare
ideology toward cooperative federalism, where the federal government
conditioned funding according to how state governments regulated and
legislated their AFDC programs in accordance with federal (constitutional)
concerns. Moreover, under this theory, the Supreme Court concluded that states
had an obligation (if they accept federal funding) to furnish aid to all eligible
poor.192 King signaled expanded control of the federal government over state
policies and practices. The King doctrine was also expanded to exclude a live
in boyfriend193 as well as a roommate.194

189. See id. The AFDC program is an example of cooperative federalism. See Alexia
Pappas, Welfare Reform: Child Welfare or the Rhetoric of Responsibility, 45 DUKE L.J.
1301, 1307 (1996); Stephen D. Sugarman, Welfare Reform and the Cooperative Federalism
of America’s Public Income Transfer Programs, 14 YALE J. ON REG. 123, 124 (1996)
(Symposium Issue).
190. King, 392 U.S. at 333 n.34.
191. Id. at 309. Justice Douglas argued that the case should have been decided on
equal protection grounds because Alabama had the option to reject federal funding and
continue imposing the maninthehouse eligibility restriction. Id. at 320, 32627, 33233
(Douglas, J., concurring).
192. Id. at 334.
193. Id. at 33536. In Lewis v. Martin decided two years after King, the Supreme Court
ruled that California could not declare a nonadopting livein boyfriend (who had no legal
obligation to provide financial assistance to the dependent child) a breadwinner “. . . unless
the bread is actually set on the table.” Lewis v. Martin, 397 U.S. 552, 559 (1970). The Lewis
case can be distinguished from King in several respects. First, unlike in King, California did
not remove the welfare mother from the welfare roll, but instead included the livein
boyfriend as a breadwinner and reduced the amount she would receive. Id. Second, the
boyfriend in this case assumed the role of spouse or stepfather whereas the boyfriend in King
did not. Id. The Supreme Court invalidated the California statute because it was in conflict
with the United States Department of Health Education and Welfare (HEW) regulation. Id.
Accordingly, it was impermissible for a state to use the income of a livein boyfriend or a
nonadopting stepfather in calculating the need of the child unless the livein boyfriend had a
legal obligation to provide such support. Id. at 557, 55960.
194. King, 392 U.S. at 33536. Van Lare v. Hurley also addressed the issue of legal
obligation in providing financial assistance for a needy child. Van Lare v. Hurley, 421 U.S.
338, 346 (1975). In Van Lare, the Supreme Court invalidated New York’s statute that used
the income generated from a roommate/lodger to be considered for determination of
benefits. Id. Briefly, the Supreme Court reiterated that it was inconsistent with the SSA to
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Under cooperative federalism, the state and federal governments jointly
administered, implemented, and financed some areas of social welfare (i.e.
AFDC, Medicaid, education). If the federal government provided grants to the
state for a particular program, the state had considerable latitude in developing
policies and regulations for such programs. However, if the state’s statutes in
relationship to the granted program were in conflict with the same federal
statute, the Supreme Court could intervene.195 The Supreme Court invalidated a
state statute if it failed to further the federal statute’s objective for the particular
program.196 In this context, the federal objective of the Social Security Act
(Title IV) was to provide assistance to all eligible poor.197 Two cases that are
perfect examples of the Supreme Court’s preemptive powers and exercise of
cooperative federalism are Carleson v. Remillard198 and Townsend v. Swank.199
In Carleson, the Supreme Court preempted a statute which was in clear
conflict with the SSA.200 Here, federal legislation required each state to provide
aid “with reasonable promptness to all eligible individuals.”201 Nancy
Remillard had one child and her husband was deployed to fight in Vietnam.202
The state of California denied aid because in order to be entitled to cash
assistance the absence of a parent had to be considered “continued absence,”
and under California regulation “absence occasioned by a father’s military
duties can never be ‘continued.’”203 The state’s regulation defined “continued
absence” in a narrow way that limited the conditions of eligibility.204 However,
the Supreme Court read the federal statute broadly and concluded that a state
was forbidden from denying AFDC benefits to a child because the parent’s
absence was due to military service.205 In fact, Congress argued that the

use the income of a person who was not the natural or legally obligated supporter of a needy
child as justification to reduce welfare benefits. Id.
195. See, e.g., Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489, 506 (1999) (quoting Zoble v. Williams, 457
U.S. 55, 69 (1982)).
196. Id.
197. See Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 480 (1970).
198. 406 U.S. 598 (1972); see generally Larry Catá Backer, Poor Relief, Welfare
Paralysis, and Assimilation, 1996 UTAH L. REV. 1 (1996) (examining constitutional cases
under a theory of mobile immobility of poor relief systems).
199. 404 U.S. 282 (1971).
200. 42 U.S.C. §§ 402(a)(10), 602 (2000).
201. Carleson, 406 U.S. at 600.
202. Id. at 599.
203. Remillard v. Carleson, 325 F. Supp. 1272, 127273 (N.D. Cal. 1971), aff’d, 406
U.S. 598 (1972).
204. Id.
205. Carleson, 406 U.S. at 604. It is significant that the law was changed in
amendments to the Social Security Act relating to the AFDC and ADC programs in 1982.
Pub. L. No. 97248, 96 Stat. 317 (1982) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 406(a)(1)
(1982)). The amendment read that a parent whose absence is “occasioned solely by reason of
the performance of active duty in a uniformed service of the United States is not considered
absent from the home.” Id. After 1982, therefore, military parents were no longer eligible for
AFDC. Id.
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eligibility requirements of parental “continued absence” included absence
attributed to any reason.206 Unfortunately, this decision made no provision for
parents who were “provisionally absent” due to unemployment or simply
because of poverty, but the Supreme Court did recognize in Townsend v. Swank
that not only were absent parents with children eligible, but also families with
children under the age of twenty continuing studies in colleges and
universities.207
In Townsend, plaintiff Georgia Townsend was denied benefits because her
child was enrolled in college.208 In the state of Illinois, mothers of poor children
between the ages of eighteen and twenty were eligible to receive benefits so
long as that child was enrolled in high school.209 However, if the child was
enrolled in college, the mother was no longer eligible for AFDC benefits.210
Under SSA, Townsend would have been eligible for benefits.211 In order to
disqualify Townsend from the state AFDC program, Illinois had the discretion
to opt out of the federal AFDC program. Since Illinois did participate in AFDC
it could set standards of eligibility to widen the requirements without breaching
their obligation under the federalstate financing arrangement.212 If Illinois
wanted to tighten eligibility standards, however, they had to adhere to the
minimum parameters already established by the SSA.213 Illinois argued that
Congress authorized such disparities in treatment among poor eligible children
and this restriction was needed in order to preserve their limited welfare
resources.214 However, the Supreme Court, unmoved by economic concerns,
noted that states may not pass laws which “are inconsistent with the [Social
Security Act] and that welfare must be furnished ‘to all eligible individuals.’”215
The Supreme Court also found no support for Illinois’ argument that
Congress allowed states to “discriminate between these needy dependent

206. Carleson, 406 U.S. at 60102. HEW’s regulations state:
Continued absence of the parent from the home constitutes the reason for
deprivation of parental support or care when the parent is out of the home, the
nature of the absence is such as either to interrupt or to terminate the parent's
functioning as a provider of maintenance, physical care, or guidance for the
child, and the known or indefinite duration of the absence precludes counting on
the parent's performance of his function in planning for the present support or
care of the child. If these conditions exist, the parent may be absent for any
reason, and he may have left only recently or some time previously.
Id.
207. 404 U.S. 282, 28688 (1971).
208. Id. at 28384.
209. Id.
210. Id.
211. Id. In 1965 Congress amended the SSA which made eighteen to twentyyearolds
eligible for AFDC if they attended a high school, vocational school, college or university.
H.R. 6675, 89th Cong. (1965) (enacted).
212. Townsend, 404 U.S. at 285.
213. Id.
214. Id. at 291.
215. Id. at 286 (quoting King v. Smith, 392 U.S. 309, 333 n.34).
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children solely upon the basis of the type of school attended.”216 At most, as
Chief Justice Burger noted in the concurring opinion, states could only
discriminate among classes of eligible poor children if it elected to forego
federal funding.217 The Supreme Court stated:
[I]n the absence of congressional authorization for the exclusion
clearly evidenced from the Social Security Act or its legislative
history, a state eligibility standard that excludes persons eligible for
assistance under federal AFDC standards violates the Social Security
Act and is therefore invalid under the Supremacy Clause.218
Accordingly, Illinois could not impose additional restrictive criteria
beyond those set forth in the SSA.219 Townsend is significant because the
Supreme Court kept the door open for considering welfare as a legitimate claim
even if the case did not establish a constitutional right to welfare. Although
Townsend demonstrated how far federal authority could reach under
cooperative federalism, not all cases involving cooperative federalism were
decided against states’ rights.
The 1971 Supreme Court decision of Wyman v. James fits the cooperative
federalist frame220 and yet embodies perhaps one of the most sweeping
encroachments on welfare rights. Wyman authorized social workers to conduct
“consent” home visits of a welfare recipient’s home to ensure eligibility
requirements were met with threat of aid suspension in the face of
noncompliance.221 Barbara James, a welfare recipient for two years, received
notice that she had to submit to a home visit by a social worker.222 Ms. James
refused to allow the social worker to visit her home, but was willing to provide
any proof of eligibility required by the law.223 The social worker did not need
any particular reason to perform the search which could be performed without a
warrant.224 The Supreme Court first concluded that since no search had in fact
occurred, this case was not within the purview of those rights considered
protected by the Fourth Amendment.225 The court held:
This natural and quite proper protective attitude, however, is not a
factor in this case, for the seemingly obvious and simple reason that
we are not concerned with any search by the New York Social

216.
217.
218.
219.
220.
221.
222.
223.
224.
225.

Id. at 287.
Id. at 292 (Burger, C.J., concurring).
Id. at 286.
Id.
400 U.S. 309 (1971).
Id. at 326.
Id. at 314.
Id.
Id. at 317.
Id. at 318.
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Service agency in the Fourth Amendment meaning of the term. . . .
[T]he visitation in itself is not forced or compelled . . . if consent to
the visitation is withheld, no visitation takes place. . . . There is no
entry of the home and there is no search. 226
In ruling as it did, the Supreme Court assumed that there was no coercion
involved in the decision to grant or withhold consent.227 The Supreme Court
further noted that even if it had concluded that the search by a caseworker was
akin to a search by a law enforcement official for a criminal investigation, the
search would not be unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment.228 The
Supreme Court decided that the privacy interest of the recipient affected by a
search is minimal and that the visits were reasonable to determine the
recipient’s eligibility.229 The visits were not part of any criminal investigation,
the recipient was not an actual or suspected perpetrator of a crime and
caseworkers were not “uniformed authorit[ies].”230 Therefore, these searches
were “reasonable administrative tool[s]” to ensure compliance with AFDC
regulations.231
The Wyman decision, which had negative Fourth Amendment
implications, served as evidence of the Supreme Court’s new resistance to
defining welfare as a property right.232 The Supreme Court remarked, “one who
dispenses purely private charity naturally has an interest in and expects to know
how his charitable funds are utilized and put to work.”233 The Supreme Court’s
support of states’ rights arguments within a federalist logic was striking in this
case because it did not observe that the state had exceeded its boundaries
concluding that the state had not overreached in a way that generated conflict
within the federal law or the Constitution.
Between the decisions reached in King and Townsend, the Supreme Court
had defined a system that allowed the federal government flexibility in
determining state AFDC regulations solely on the basis that they provided most
of the money.234 This system did not allow states to create rules that were more

226. Id. at 31718; see also Erik G. Luna, Welfare Fraud and the Fourth Amendment,
24 PEPP. L. REV. 1235, 125480 (1997) (discussing various types of searches that can be
performed on a welfare recipient’s home without violating the Fourth Amendment).
227. Wyman, 400 U.S. at 317.
228. Id. at 318 (emphasis added).
229. Id. at 31819.
230. Id. at 32223.
231. Id. at 326.
232. For an alternative discussion of the Supreme Court theme in Wyman v. James, see
Thomas Ross, The Rhetoric of Poverty: Their Immorality, Our Helplessness, 79 GEO. L.J.
1499, 152225 (1991).
233. Wyman, 400 U.S. at 319 (emphasis added).
234. Townsend v. Swank, 404 U.S. 282, 291 (1971); King v. Smith, 392 U.S. 309, 316
(1968).
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restrictive and hence struck down many state regulations.235 But because the
Court also recognized at least the limited validity of state regulations, these
cases helped give rise to a new Supreme Court interpretive variation most
generally understood as “new federalism.”236 The rubric of “new federalism”
institutionalized deference to the state by both Congress and the Supreme
Court, for legislating in areas that had historically been controlled by the
federal government.237
New York State Department of Social Services v. Dublino represents one
of the clearest articulations of the Supreme Court’s move away from
cooperative federalism and into the domain of new federalism and a full
endorsement of states’ rights.238 In Dublino, it was clear that the state and
federal legislation were in conflict, but instead of invalidating the state statute,
the Supreme Court found that the Work Incentive Program (WIN) did not
forbid the “Work Rules” enacted by the state of New York.239
In 1971, the state of New York enacted “Work Rules.”240 Work Rules
required that all recipients who can work must “report every two weeks to pick
up their assistance checks in person; to file every two weeks a certificate . . .
[stating they could not find] suitable employment; to report for requested
employment interviews; to report to the public employment office the result of
a referral for employment; and not to fail willfully to report for suitable
employment, when available.”241 If a recipient failed to perform these
requirements under the work rules, welfare benefits were discontinued.242 By
contrast, the federal government’s Work Incentive Program (WIN) did not
require welfare recipient to demonstrate an effort to seek employment as a
condition for receiving benefits.243 The plaintiffs, most of whom were Black
mothers, challenged the validity of Work Rules in light of the WIN
legislation.244 The Supreme Court revitalized states’ rights in its decision and
reiterated the theory of “new federalism” for solving conflicts over welfare
policy legislation.245 While the New York work requirement was in clear
conflict with the WIN legislation, the Supreme Court found persuasive the
state’s argument that welfare recipients should demonstrate their efforts to find

235. See Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 261 (1970); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S.
618, 633 (1969); King v. Smith, 392 U.S. 309, 32021 (1968).
236. See Horowitz, supra note 169, at 131.
237. 413 U.S. 405 (1973).
238. Id. at 41213; see also Judith Olans Brown, Lucy A. Williams & Phyllis Tropper
Baumann, The Mythogenesis of Gender: Judicial Images of Women in Paid and Unpaid
Labor, 6 UCLA WOMEN’S L.J. 457, 492 (1996).
239. N.Y. State Dep’t of Soc. Serv., 413 U.S. at 41112.
240. Id. at 405.
241. Id. at 40809.
242. Id. at 409.
243. Dublino v. N.Y. State Dep’t of Soc. Serv., 348 F. Supp. 290, 295 (W.D.N.Y.
1972), rev’d, 413 U.S. 405 (1973).
244. Id.
245. N.Y. State Dep’t of Soc. Serv., 413 U.S. at 413.
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work and demonstrate a profile of employability; and concluded that the statute
did not present a real obstacle to the goals and philosophies of the federal
program.246
Thus, despite the existence of the federal work incentive scheme, the
Supreme Court ruled that there was no “clear manifestation” of any
Congressional intent to block state policies that required recipients to
demonstrate efforts to work.247 Under new federalism, the Supreme Court was
free to interpret how federal statutes—particularly those that favored
recipients—were implemented by the state.
Jefferson v. Hackney serves as another example of the new federalist
approach, where the Supreme Court decided that the state of Texas had the
power to distribute its welfare resources unevenly.248 The Texas Constitution
provided that the state could participate in any federal welfare programs, but
could only allocate a maximum of $80,000 to fund the entire program.249 This
included funding for AFDC, Old Age Assistance (OAA),250 Aid to the Blind
(AB),251 and Aid for the Permanently and Totally Disabled (APTD).252 In order
to efficiently use the funds, Texas calculated the financial need of each
individual recipient who applied for the various programs.253 If the person was
handicapped and eligible for a welfare program other than AFDC, that
individual received ninetyfive to one hundred percent of the calculated
financial need.254 However if the person was eligible for AFDC, that person
only received fifty percent of their calculated financial need.255 This resulted in
a significant decrease in benefits paid to the predominately Black AFDC
program as compared to the predominately White OAA, AB, or APTD
programs.256
In upholding this budgetary scheme, the Supreme Court confirmed, “there
is no question that states have considerable latitude in allocating their AFDC
resources, since each state is free to set its own standards of need and to
determine the level of benefits by the amount of funds it devotes to the

246. Id.; see also Brown et al., supra note 238, at 49195 (arguing that the Supreme
Court’s decision in Dublino created legal doctrine which contributed to the oppression of
women, particularly in the context of welfare and paid labor).
247. N.Y. State Dep’t of Soc. Serv., 413 U.S. at 413, 41415 (quoting Schwartz v.
Texas, 344 U.S. 199, 20203 (1952).
248. Jefferson v. Hackney, 406 U.S. 535, 541 (1972); see also Marion Buckley,
Eliminating the PerChild Allotment in the AFDC Program, 13 LAW & INEQ. J. 169, 187
(1994) (providing an overview of AFDC and discussing the effects of Supreme Court
decisions on perchild allotment legislation).
249. Jefferson, 406 U.S. at 537, 537 n.1.
250. Grants to States of OldAge Assistance for the Aged, 42 U.S.C. § 301 (2000).
251. Grants to States for Aid to the Blind, 42 U.S.C. § 1201 (repealed 1974).
252. Grants to States for Aid to the Permanently and Totally Disabled, 42 U.S.C. §
1352 (1996); Jefferson, 406 U.S. at 537 n.2.
253. Jefferson, 406 U.S. at 537.
254. Id. at 537, 537 n.3.
255. Id.
256. Id.
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program.”257 This case demonstrated a clear ideological shift that veered
towards complete deference to “states’ rights” in ways that had direct and dire
implications for specifically workingclass Black women navigating welfare.
Federalism continues to be a central lens through which current welfare
cases are decided by the Supreme Court.258 However, the emerging new
federalist approach to welfare demonstrates the growing significance of fiscal
concern as a legitimate claim and the rise of fiscal conservatism as a viable
framework for endorsing a state’s rights argument in welfare law and policy
decisions.
III. FISCAL CONSERVATISM
Advocates of a fiscally conservative polity were generally critical of
allocating public funds to povertyrelated social programs (as opposed to tax
subsidies for the wealthy or defense spending).259 Therefore, the rationale of
fiscal conservatism became a powerful interpretive framework through which
states adjusted welfare regulations to limit the welfare rolls.260 Supreme Court
decisions were more directly shaped by economically conservative approaches
for evaluating the use value or even costbenefits of social programs for the
poor, perhaps influenced by three other developments: a larger backlash against
the perceived politics of the 1960s, the ascendancy of centrist democratic and
right wing republican governments, and a growth in national deficit. When
recipients and their advocates turned to the Supreme Court to challenge
restrictive state welfare regulations, most states argued that regulations were
needed to control their rising fiscal budgets.261 For example, in the Shapiro
decision, the state of Connecticut argued that the statutory residency

257. Id. at 541 (quoting King v. Smith, 392 U.S. 309, 31819 (1968)).
258. While Jefferson solidifies a new federalist outlook, it is also worth mentioning
here that this case could also have been explored through the lens of the Equal Protection
Clause. One of the main arguments advanced by the appellants was that it was unfair to
provide the predominantly white advanced aged and the disabled with higher payments than
the predominately Black AFDC recipients. Id. at 54647. Dispensing funds in this manner
was not only unfair on its face but also distributed along racial lines. The Supreme Court, in
one line dismissed these arguments as “unproved allegations of racial discrimination” and
instead admonished that there is no federal constitutional or statutory requirement that relief
provided under AFDC or OAA or AB or APTD be treated exactly alike. Id. And with this,
the decision signaled the end of any interpretation of welfare by the Supreme Court as a
constitutional right.
259. See generally MICHAEL K. BROWN, RACE, MONEY, AND THE AMERICAN WELFARE
STATE (1999); MICHAEL B. KATZ, IN THE SHADOW OF THE POORHOUSE: A SOCIAL HISTORY OF
WELFARE IN AMERICA (rev. ed. 1996); CHARLES MURRAY, LOSING GROUND: AMERICAN
SOCIAL POLICY, 19501980 (2d ed. 1994); FRANCIS FOX PIVEN AND RICHARD CLOWARD,
REGULATING THE POOR: THE FUNCTIONS OF PUBLIC WELFARE (Vintage Books, 2d ed. 1993);
MIKE DAVIS, PRISONERS OF THE AMERICAN DREAM: POLITICS AND ECONOMY IN THE HISTORY
OF THE U.S. WORKING CLASS (1986).
260. See, e.g., Lyng v. UAW, 481 U.S. 368, 372 (1987); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394
U.S. 618, 623 (1969).
261. Shapiro, 394 U.S. at 623.

34

WISCONSIN JOURNAL OF LAW, GENDER & SOCIETY

[Vol. 23:1

requirement was necessary “to protect its fisc[al concerns] by discouraging
entry of those who come needing relief.”262 Unless these arguments were in
direct conflict with the SSA or violated a fundamental right (as in Shapiro), the
Supreme Court gave deference to the state.
In the fiscally conservative era, states used various policy tactics to keep
their welfare budgets and rolls low, including child exclusion laws (also
referred to as the “family cap” rules),263 “man in the house” rules,264 and
residency requirements.265 As discussed earlier, the “family cap” rule
discouraged mothers from continuing to have more children, reportedly in
order to receive increased welfare payments.266 Within the larger policy agenda
of centrist Democratic President Bill Clinton, 1996 set the stage to “end welfare
as we know it,” a policy approach strengthened by the backdrop of new
litigation. The Supreme Court retreated from recipient advocacy and most
policy decisions regarding the administration of welfare benefits were left to
the discretion of the state within the “new federalist” philosophy.
Despite scarce rulings, a 1995 case decided during the Clinton
Administration foreshadowed the fiscally conservative parameters of future
welfare policy.267 In Anderson v. Edwards, Verna Edwards was caring for her
granddaughter while receiving benefits from AFDC on her granddaughter’s
behalf.268 In order to prevent her two grandnieces from going into foster care,
Ms. Edwards also began caring for them.269 The grandnieces were also
receiving AFDC and Ms. Edwards was not under any legal obligation to care
for any of the children.270 In 1984, Congress amended the SSA and counted
parents, children, and grandparents who lived together as one family unit for
payment purposes under AFDC.271 Subsequently, California also changed its
law to include all extended family living together as a part of one single family
unit for purposes of calculating AFDC benefits.272 Under the new rule, when
the state calculated the financial need of a family, it included all money coming

262. Id.
263. See Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 473 (1970) (sustaining a Maryland
AFDC regulation under which “the standard of need increases with each additional person in
the household, but the increments become proportionately smaller”).
264. King v. Smith, 392 U.S. 309, 316 (1968); see also discussion supra Part II.
265. See generally, Shapiro, 394 U.S. at 618 (invalidating a statutory provision
denying welfare assistance to residents of a state who had not resided within that jurisdiction
for at least one year).
266. See Dandridge, 397 U.S. at 47374.
267. Anderson v. Edwards, 514 U.S. 143 (1995).
268. Id. at 148.
269. Respondent’s Brief on the Merits at 810, Anderson v. Edwards, 514 U.S. 143
(1994) (No. 931883).
270. Id. at 6.
271. Deficit Reduction Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98369, § 2640(a), 98 Stat. 1145
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 602(a)(38)(39) (1991)).
272. Anderson, 514 U.S. at 14648.
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into the home from any sources and reduced the AFDC check accordingly.273
As a result of this change in law, Ms. Edwards’ AFDC payment was reduced
by over $200.00.274
The Supreme Court’s ruling in Anderson affirmed states’ rights to
implement family reduction plans if all children, regardless of kinship or
obligations to financially support, lived in the same household.275 Under federal
AFDC standards, children received higher benefits if they were considered
children of separate family units that simply live together (a difference of
$200).276 However, in order to save money and to establish lower benefit levels,
the state of California grouped all children living in the same household as one
single family.277 This ruling was emblematic of the Supreme Court’s move
from a new federalist to a fiscal conservative approach, making the state’s
budgetary concerns for scaling back welfare expenditures a legitimate
consideration within the bounds of Supreme Court decisions about welfare
legislation.278
In fact, a real conflict did exist between state and federal guidelines for
family welfare benefits. While federal benefits approved of a reduction scheme
similar to the one adopted by California, a state was only allowed to use the
income of the recipient in order to calculate his or her financial need.279 In
Anderson, by combining family units based upon residency, California was
able to consider the income of anyone in the home to calculate the financial
need, even if everyone in the home did not share that income.280 The Supreme
Court ignored this clear conflict with SSA in favor of state fiscal concerns.
Consequently, instead of preempting state statutes via federal guidelines, the
Supreme Court held that the state’s legislation was not inconsistent with the
philosophy of the federal program.281 States could, therefore, control their
welfare budgets by grouping children cared for by the same person into a single
family unit.282

273. Id. at 154.
274. Id. Prior to the consolidated family unit rule, Ms. Edward’s received $341 for her
granddaughter and $560 for her grandnieces. Id. at 148; see also Irma S. Jurado, Anderson v.
Edwards: Can Two Live More Cheaply Than One? The Effect of Cohabitation on AFDC
Grants, 26 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 301, 322 (1996).
275. Anderson, 514 U.S. at 15758.
276. Lukhard v. Reed, 481 U.S. 368, 371 (1987). For a limited discussion of Justice
Scalia’s statutory interpretations in Lukhard v. Reed, see Stephen A. Plass, The Illusion and
Allure of Textualism, 40 VILL. L. REV. 93, 11719 (1995) and Elizabeth A. Liess, Comment,
Censoring Legislative History: Justice Scalia on the Use of Legislative History in Statutory
Interpretation, 72 NEB. L. REV. 568, 58182 (1993).
277. Anderson, 514 U.S. at 14647.
278. See Anderson, 514 U.S. at 152.
279. Respondent’s Brief on the Merits, supra note 269, at 12.
280. Anderson, 514 U.S. at 14647.
281. See Anderson, 514 U.S. at 143.
282. Id. at 14546.
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The clear implication of the Anderson case was that conservative policy
makers had retreated from the policy of providing for America’s poor, using
monetary caps to preserve fiscal budgets and put the poor on the road to work.
Other examples of this fiscally conservative approach are represented in the
significant cases, Lukhard v. Reed283 and Lyng v. UAW.284
The fiscal conservative approach unabashedly initiated a purely pro
capitalist (as opposed to labor) stance on welfare entitlement by repressing
labor activism through loss of benefits and by decreasing welfare payments
through the recalculation of what income would reduce a recipient’s aid. In
1981, Congress passed the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1981
(OBRA), designed to reduce the federal budget.285 One section of OBRA
purported to make families ineligible for aid if they received income exceeding
the need level determined by a particular state.286 Based on the federal statute,
income was never defined.287 This gave states the freedom to create their own
parameters.
In Lukhard v. Reed, the Supreme Court was asked to determine whether a
civil judgment for personal injury should be calculated as a welfare recipient’s
income for calculating eligibility.288 The state of Virginia included lump sum
payments of personal injury awards as income, for purposes of determining
eligibility.289 Ona Mae Reed received a lump sum personal injury payment
which she used for household living expenses.290 This lump sum payment
subsequently disqualified her from AFDC funds.291 Ms. Reed argued that
counting personal injury payments as income violated federal law.292 Under
OBRA, the period of ineligibility for benefits depended on whether a personal
injury award was deemed as income or assets.293 If the personal injury award
was considered income,294 the state could deny aid to the welfare recipient for
as long as the money should last if the person received that monthly economic
equivalent from the state.295 However, if the personal injury award were
considered an asset, Ms. Reed would only lose aid for the month in which the

283. 481 U.S. 368 (1987).
284. 485 U.S. 360 (1988).
285. Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1981, Pub. L. No. 9735, 95 Stat. 736737
(codified at 7 U.S.C. § 2015(d)(3) (1981)).
286. Lukhard, 481 U.S. at 371.
287. See 42 U.S.C. § 602(a)(17) (1982 & Supp. at 111).
288. Lukhard, 481 U.S. at 371; see supra note 276.
289. Lukhard, 481 U.S. at 37273.
290. Id. at 386 (Powell, J. dissenting).
291. Id. at 391 (Powell, J. dissenting).
292. Id. at 373.
293. Id. at 371.
294. “‘Income may be defined as the gain derived from capital, from labor, or from
both combined,’ provided it be understood to include profit gained through a sale or
conversion of capital assets . . .” Id. at 37475 (quoting Eisner v. Macomber, 252 U.S. 189,
207 (1920)).
295. Id. at 372.
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personal injury award was received.296 Labeling a personal injury award as
income could be particularly devastating to a permanently disabled mother.
The Supreme Court upheld Virginia’s classification of the personal injury
award as income, declaring that it was not inconsistent with the OBRA and
AFDC statutes, which allowed the state to reduce its budget at the expense of
the welfare recipient.297 Lukhard embodied the rising hegemonic force of fiscal
conservatism and its evaluative cost benefit standards over and above family
need and social justice.
In Lyng v. UAW, welfare recipients were forced to choose between social
activism and social welfare benefits.298 In OBRA, Congress decided that those
who faced a temporary loss of income due to their position on the picket line
would be ineligible for food stamps.299 Mary Berry went on strike because her
union and employer could not reach an agreement regarding the terms of her
employment contract.300 While the strike continued, Ms. Berry received strike
insurance benefits for her living expenses.301 Subsequently, she applied for food
stamps to supplement the insurance but was rejected on the basis of her
participation in the strike.302 Ms. Berry argued among other things, that OBRA
violated the Equal Protection Clause because it denied eligibility to strikers but
allowed those who quit their employment to be eligible.303
The Supreme Court summarily dismissed this equal protection claim
instead opting to evaluate the merits of this case based on “protecting the fiscal
integrity of Government programs.”304 Using fiscal integrity as a guise for
“maintaining neutrality in private labor disputes,” the Supreme Court was able
to mask a clear bias against labor activism.305 While not directly stated, the
Supreme Court’s ruling suggested that providing aid to strikers would drain the
fiscal resources preserved for those deemed now not just morally, but
politically worthy of welfare benefits. Therefore, a certain level of
discrimination by Congress is warranted (and obviously approved by the
Supreme Court) in order to preserve benefits for the “deserving poor.” These
cases powerfully demonstrate the degree to which marketplace poverty became
an indicator of moral failings that, at least by this time, the Supreme Court
decided could only be remedied by the public policy ideology of fiscal
conservatism.

296. Id.
297. Id. at 383.
298. 485 U.S. 360, 360 (1988).
299. Id. at 371; see also Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97
35, 95 Stat. 736737 (codified at 7 U.S.C. § 2015(d)(3) (1981)).
300. Brief for Appellees at 16, Lyng v. UAW, 485 U.S. 360 (1988) (No. 861471).
301. Id.
302. Id. at 1617.
303. UAW v. Lyng, 648 F. Supp. 1234, 1243 (D.C.C. 1985), rev’d, 485 U.S. 360
(1988).
304. Lyng v. UAW, 485 U.S. 360, 373 (1988).
305. Id. at 37273.
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CONCLUSION
These Supreme Court cases are both reflective of, and at the same time
have, shaped America’s welfare policies and public opinion. The first Supreme
Court cases under examination established that the Supreme Court was
interested in protecting equal rights and due process while working within
existing frameworks of governance.306 The most monumental cases for this
stage of the welfare legal legacy were Shapiro v. Thompson and Goldberg v.
Kelly in which the Supreme Court’s rulings came pretty close to nationalizing
AFDC and establishing a right to welfare. However, the Supreme Court
concluded that “the Due Process Clauses generally confer no affirmative right
to governmental aid, even where such aid may be necessary to secure life,
liberty, or property interests of which the government itself may not deprive the
individual.”307 Additionally, the Supreme Court rejected constitutional
mandates for “necessities of life” or declaring these “necessities” as
“fundamental interests” of the individual.308 Further, the Supreme Court also
failed to provide a remedy for economic conditions that may discriminately
prevent or augment access to the “universal” civil and political rights that allow
a citizen to act.309
The Supreme Court was also interested in preserving grander notions of
federalism. Such federal and state governing techniques ranged from
“cooperative federalism” to “new federalism.” While the line shifted in the
balance of power between state and federal authority, there was a consistent
Supreme Court mandate that state policies adhere, at some level, to federal
guidelines.310 When the shift to “fiscal conservatism” emerged, however,
decisions by the Supreme Court ultimately led toward a more costbenefit
deference to a states’ rights approach and away from concepts of federal
authority, fundamental rights, and/or Due Process. AFDC decisions by the
Supreme Court endorsed federalism and granted the recipient legislative
entitlement status, but AFDC was never established as a constitutional right.311
Moving into the twentyfirst century, the idea of welfare as a federal
entitlement or even as a federal program has become a thing of the past.

306. See, e.g., Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 645 (1969) (Warren, J.,
dissenting); King v. Smith, 392 U.S. 309 (1968).
307. DeShaney v. Winnebago Co. Dep’t. of Soc. Serv., 489 U.S. 189, 196 (1989).
308. See generally Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297 (1980) (sustaining an amendment
denying public funding for medically necessary abortions); Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56
(1972) (rejecting a constitutional guarantee of minimum shelter); Dandridge v. Williams,
397 U.S. 471, 473 (1970) (sustaining a Maryland AFDC regulation under which “the
standard of need increases with each additional person in the household, but the increments
become proportionately smaller.”).
309. See Lyng v. UAW, 485 U.S. 360 (1988) (validating a 1981 amendment which
denied eligibility for food stamps if a member of the household went on strike).
310. See Carleson v. Remillard, 406 U.S. 598 (1972); Townsend v. Swank, 404 U.S.
282 (1971); King v. Smith, 392 U.S. 309 (1968); see also N.Y. State Dep’t of Soc. Serv. v.
Dublino, 413 U.S. 405 (1973).
311. King, 392 U.S. at 32527.
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Unfortunately, Temporary Aid to Needy Families, (TANF)312 a shortterm
relief program has become the superficially and inadequate response to the
longterm poverty problem. The landscape of longterm poverty is laden with
policy judgments based intentionally, subconsciously or consequentially on
considerations of race and gender.
With such emphasis placed on “the law,” the Supreme Court appears to
hold itself above the fray of public opinion, but welfare policy exposes this
perspective as a fallacy. As critical race scholars have long shown, the Supreme
Court may not be able to change the law, but the Justices’ beliefs about
responsibility and deservedness heavily inform their decisions about the spirit
of the law.313 The inescapable conclusion is that a gendered and racially
unequal procapitalist socioeconomy has profoundly shaped the “neutral” laws
surrounding welfare policy. Procapitalism and fiscal conservatism, for
example, are at the intersection of a national attack on the “welfare queen”
albatross. The Supreme Court has both responded to and helped shape that
intersection . . . and that attack. Though political analysts and activists have so
far been reluctant to acknowledge the Court’s role in welfare policy, welfare
advocates would be welladvised to plan future prowelfare initiatives with a
full understanding of the role the Supreme Court might play in influencing the
success of those efforts.

312. Temporary Aid to Needy Families (TANF), Pub. L. No. 104193, 111 Stat. 2105
(1996) (as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 601).
313. See, e.g. Derrick Bell, Brown v. Board of Education and the Interest
Convergence Dilemma, 93 HARV. L. REV. 518, 523 (1980) (introducing interest convergence
theory which suggests that the white majority will advocate for advantages or benefits for
black people only if advocating for these benefits will also advance white selfinterest.); see
also MARY L. DUDZIAK, COLD WAR CIVIL RIGHTS: RACE AND THE IMAGE OF AMERICAN
DEMOCRACY 26 (2000) (using Bell’s interest convergence theory and applying it in the case
of the Cold War).

